In all the to and fro of the current carbon pricing debate here in Australia, one important aspect of the story on climate action is missing.

Why are we acting on climate change? Well, because of the evidence that it poses risks to the global economy, to infrastructure, and to our natural environment. All that is true and makes for a compelling case for action. But at its very core – climate change is a health issue.

It places the safety and wellbeing of our species in jeopardy. Climate change is already responsible for the deaths of more than 300,000 people each year.[1] Five million more deaths are expected during the next decade if no effective action is taken to reduce climate risk.[2]  Over 80% of the disease burden attributable to climate change falls on children.[3]

The international medical journal The Lancet outlined the stark facts in 2009: that the effects of climate change from global warming “puts the lives and wellbeing of billions of people at increased risk”.

Climate change presents serious immediate and long term threats to the health and wellbeing of the Australian and global population.

The direct health effects of climate change include deaths, injury, and hospitalisation associated with increasingly frequent and intense bushfires, cyclones, storms and floods, and heatwaves.[4] Indirect effects include increases in infectious and vector borne diseases, worsening chronic illness, and health risks from poor water quality and food insecurity.[5]

Health care services in Australia are already experiencing dramatic increases in service demand from climate related events, such as heatwaves and floods.[6]^,[7] The heatwave that preceded the Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria in 2009 saw a 62% increase in mortality from heat related illnesses and worsening chronic medical conditions. During this five day event, there was a 46% increase in demand for ambulances; an eight-fold increase in heat related presentations to emergency departments; a 2.8 fold increase in cardiac arrests; and a threefold increase in patients dead on arrival.[8]

So there are many compelling reasons to act on climate change from the point of view of reducing health risks. This story is missing however from the policy debate – it is missing in the explanations from our leaders about why we must act, it is missing from the narrative of many advocacy groups who imagine that a threat to polar bears will be sufficient to elicit support for action. This is not proving to be the case.

Health is not only one of the most compelling reasons to act on climate change – its actually one of the reasons most people will feel compelled to act on climate change, because framing climate change as a health issue is one of the ways we can best appeal to people’s individual assessment of risk from climate change. Put in a health context, people are far more inclined to consider climate change as an issue that affects them. 

And there are many health gains possible from climate action. Reducing our reliance on energy supply from coal and encouraging shifts in transport away from fossil-fuel-guzzling cars to public transport will reduce air pollution, improve social capital and bring concurrent increases in activity which, in turn, all help reduce obesity, osteoporosis, heart disease and diabetes, not to mention road traffic injuries and deaths.

Shifting away from coal as a fuel source for electricity will improve air quality and reduce related deaths from lung cancer and heart disease. Switching to low emissions and more active transport systems can significantly improve air quality and reduce respiratory disease, as well as cut the incidence of obesity, chronic illness and cardiovascular disease. Changing to a diet with lower meat consumption can cut emissions from livestock production as well reduce heart disease and diabetes.[9]

The economic argument for the health benefits of climate action is also very strong: a recent report from the European Union reveals significant health and economic benefits are associated with strong targets for emissions reductions, with a target of 30% reduction by 2020 expected to deliver health care savings from avoided ill health of €80 billion per year.[10]

Effective action on climate change has the potential to significantly reduce the health costs (both economic and social) we will face in the next decade and the coming century. It’s also an important way to build public support for action [11]. If our political leaders were serious about building public support (and acting in the national interest), they would be talking about addressing “the biggest threat to global health of the 21^st century”,[12] not talking about compensating polluting industries. That needs to change.

News updates on Germany’s renewables achievements and objectives to 2020 caught my attention because I had recently drafted a policy paper on solar PV feed in tariffs in WA, and naturally a quick literature review highlighted Germany as the pace setter in clean energy policy delivery and outcomes.

Well, last month Chancellor Angela Merkel reviewed the nation’s progress on its renewables goal (comprising 17% of German energy requirements now) and laid down the gauntlet to achieve 35% of all energy requirements by 2020, 50% by 2030 and 80% by 2050. (Reuters)

Now in case you’re thinking that it’s no surprise given the strength of the German Green Party, don’t forget that the Greens are firmly back in opposition whereas Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is more the ideological sibling to our own mainstream conservative party.

Now taking the comparison with Australia a little further, imagine the debate that would ensue if our biggest CO2 emitters presented a forecast akin to that below, after scenario-planning the move from fossil fuel and nuclear generation to renewables.

“RWE—Germany’s biggest producer of electricity by output capacity and Europe’s largest emitter of CO2—is forecasting a fall of more than 50% in recurrent after-tax profit by 2013, compared with 2010’s €3.75 billion. The company has said it intends increasingly to focus on the higher-growth markets of Eastern and Southeastern Europe and Turkey.” (Hromadko)

This was no fairy tale; RWE, one of Germany’s largest industrial conglomerates is understandably not happy with its business outlook; but rather than play ostrich it has been quick to adapt to future realities by investing AUS$1.4 billion per year in renewable projects since 2008.

Now at this point I have to be truthful; RWE’s troubles are not solely due to the “warm fuzzy green feeling” washing over the German government and public. RWE has heavy exposure to the nuclear sector and since Fukashima, well, the sky has sort of closed in. Within days of the disaster, Chancellor Merkel’s government suspended a plan—agreed upon only last year—to extend the lives of Germany’s 17 reactors, and instead committed to an accelerated exit from nuclear power. (Hromadko).

Admittedly adding to the pressure on Merkel, the CDU recently lost power in the State of Baden-Württemberg following 60 years of CDU rule, to the Green Party.  The historic result was largely seen as a referendum on nuclear power.

Now the German government is combining its push for renewables with a rapid retreat from its existing nuclear assets.

Some analysts have argued that a nuclear scale-back in Germany would prevent the country from reaching its long-term climate and energy goals. In reality, Germany is already well on its way to transitioning from nuclear and fossil fuel power to renewable energy.

Finally there’s that old economic chestnut often touted by critics, many of whom had hypothesised that Germany’s unwavering support for renewable energy would place a drag on the economy. Yes, Germany did suffer a downturn in 2008 and 2009, but the rebound was rapid. Germany’s export-led recovery added 3.6% to GDP in 2010, giving Germany the strongest export growth in three decades. (Focus economics). What’s the point? Well in a country where the key export sectors are energy and carbon intensive—heavy machinery and components, diversified industrials, cars and chemicals;  think BMW, BASF, Siemens, Bosch, Thyssen Krupp, and MAN—any government would be very wary of killing the geese that lay the golden eggs through punitive energy policies.

Germany’s 20-year affair with renewables quite possibly gives the nation the confidence and expertise to transition such an energy-intensive economy. For example Germany is expected to become the first nation to reach broad scale grid parity on PVs by 2012-2013. (FME, 2007)

Finally the jobs: Renewable energy now employs 370,000, compared to 50,000 in the coal industry, and Germany forecasts that its exports of clean energy technologies and expertise will continue to expand in the future (IEA 2010).

While not without its difficulties, the German renewables story just keeps getting better. But perhaps most impressive is to think that within four decades, the world’s fourth largest economy will be powered almost entirely by wind, solar, biomass, hydro, and geothermal power.

References

Hromadko, J, (2011) “Trying to Solve the German Energy Conundrum”, Wall Street Journal, viewed May 16^th, 2011. 

Schwagerl, S, (2011) “Germany’s Unlikely Champion of a Radical Green Energy Path”, Reuters. viewed May 17^th, 2011.

Focus Economics (2011) Germany’s economic indicators 2011, viewedMay 17^th, 2011

Federal Ministry for the Environment. (2007). EEG – The renewable energy sources act: The success story of sustainable policies for Germany.

International Energy Agency, Photovoltaic Power Systems (2010). A Review of International Photovoltaic Applications

And if you’re really keen – some further reading

Germany’s overall energy strategic plan (in English).

The impressive objectives Germany has set itself are laid out in the rather chunky National Renewable Energy Plan.

The tactics and techniques for manufacturing doubt in the face of a scientific consensus were perfected by major tobacco companies during the 1950’s and 60’s, in their efforts to discredit cancer researchers’ burgeoning evidence of the link between smoking and lung cancer. In his 1995 book “Cancer Wars,” Robert Proctor documented the influences of professional, economic, and political interest groups on American governmental priorities and funding of cancer research. An infamous 1969 memo from one corporate executive declared that “Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the means of establishing a controversy.”

David Michaels’ 2005 article in “Scientific American” on the manufacture of uncertainty and later, his 2008 book, followed Proctor’s lead. He identified three primary messages orchestrated by the tobacco industry to challenge the scientific consensus linking smoking with lung cancer: (1) Cause-effect relationships have not been established, (2) Statistical analyses are inconclusive, and (3) More research is needed. This industry hired its own scientists, founded its own research publication (“Tobacco and Health Research”), and carefully orchestrated a media campaign to spread their messages. Since then, Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway’s 2010 book on similar themes appeared, updated to include accounts of how doubts were manufactured concerning climate change and global warming in particular by organizations employing tactics inspired by the tobacco industry’s example. I won’t go into the details of doubt-inducing tactics here; the sources I’ve just mentioned do an excellent job on that topic. Instead, I want to raise two issues that supplement those covered by those sources.

First, I should point out that uncertainty has its uses regardless of one’s political stripe. Indeed, doubts can serve both sides of a scientific controversy simultaneously, albeit for different purposes. Some fifteen years before Proctor’s book, I wrote an account (Smithson, 1980) of how both environmentalists and industrialists used initial uncertainties about the effects of CFCs on the ozone layer to bolster their agendas. Each side had seized on one of the two favorite responses to profound uncertainty. The environmentalists’ position was a precursor to the precautionary principle: Ban CFCs until it can be proven that they are not harmful. The industrialists’ argument reflected a well-known status-quo bias: Allow CFC production and marketing until they are proven harmful.  Also, as we shall see, the mainstream media has uses for uncertainty, especially if it can be framed as controversy or conflict.

Second, Machiavellian scheming and normative scholarly skepticism are not the only producers of doubt. Doubt also can be an unintended byproduct of debate or balanced coverage of an issue. Journalists have been taken to task recently for giving “equal” time to global warming disbelievers, on grounds that the scientific consensus is so strong that lending credibility to disbelievers does the public a disservice.  

The Australian media treatment of Ian Plimer’s 2009 book, “Heaven and Earth,” is a case in point. Plimer’s book was published just prior to the debate on the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) legislation in the Australian House of Representatives (June) and the Senate (August) in 2009. Despite the book being discredited by several of Australia’s top climate scientists, several newspapers published favorable editorials and opinion pieces about it, portraying it as a telling counter-argument against the scientific consensus on climate change.

Instead of being outraged about such occurrences, understanding the motivations and payoffs behind such practices may provide clues about how they might be reformed.  Holly Stocking and Lisa Holstein’s 2009 paper presented a case study of the media coverage of a controversy following the rapid growth of industrial hog production in North Carolina during the 1908’s and 1990’s. Stocking and Holstein are former science journalists who became academics. Their chief interest was journalists’ responses to various attempts by the North Carolina Pork Council to discredit and discourage a University of North Carolina public health scientist’s research regarding health and environmental problems arising from hog production.

Stocking and Holstein began with the claim that “…claims-makers who offer contrary views, however outrageous, often are quoted in news stories because their inclusion reinforces the impression of journalistic objectivity, a hallowed ideal and a defining norm of journalists’ professional values.” (pg. 28). A byproduct of this even-handed exposure of views is increased (and perhaps unwarranted) public doubts about views that nonetheless are backed by considerable evidence and expert authority. One of their central claims was that often the combatants are aware of this norm and try to exploit it. A related point is that the scientists’ norm of openly admitting limitations and uncertainties pertaining to their research findings can be a disadvantage when less scrupulous opponents magnify those caveats in order to discredit the research or the scientists themselves.

Stocking and Holstein related four kinds of journalistic attitudinal clusters to the ways in which journalists treat conflicting views in scientific controversies.

• Disseminator: Ascertaining facts and getting them to the public quickly. All viewpoints are to be presented impartially, regardless of any differences in credibility or status. It is up to the public to sift through the competing views and decide which are plausible and which not.
• Interpretive/Investigative: Investigating deeper interpretations behind the facts and providing useful context. This stance requires that the journalist make some independent judgments about what is credible or reasonable and what is not.
• Populist Mobilizer: Giving a voice to the public and influencing political agendas. Again, this orientation entails some independent judgments on the part of the journalist, especially concerning what s/he thinks the public needs to know.
• Adversarial: Maintaining vigilance and skepticism of public officials and special interest groups. This role involves uncovering hidden interests served by public pronouncements or silences in scientific controversies.

The Disseminator and Adversarial roles are the most likely to raise doubts, but they do so in different ways. The Disseminator’s pursuit of even-handedness can lend weight to views that in other forums would be completely discredited. Stocking and Holstein’s examples of this approach included a reporter who “believed it was his obligation to publish the views of all parties to the hog research controversy, including the pork industry’s ‘pseudo-science’ label [of the UNC researcher’s studies] and its charges that the University of North Carolina had an ‘anti-farm bias.’” (pg. 32) The Adversarial journalist, on the other hand, is more likely to raise moral doubts (e.g., are the scientists truly impartial about the evidence? Do they have vested interests of their own?). Stocking and Holstein’s example here was an article that “framed UNC’s School of Public Health as a tax-supported institution that was taking an ‘activist stance’ with varied ‘anti-hog’ activities in research and educational programs alike.” (pg. 35)

Journalist Colin Schutz’s blog in August 2010, “Tips for young science journalists: A crash course on the major issues in the field,” echoes the Stocking-Holstein claim regarding a widespread norm among journalists to give every side to an issue airing. He presents this as an example of a “frame” for a story. But his rationale isn’t objectivity or even impartiality. It’s attracting the readers: “The most common frame by far in journalism is conflict. Here is a ‘good’ guy. Here is a ‘bad’ guy. The journalist might play up whatever opposition there is between them. Setting up some conflict gets the reader to associate with the people involved, bringing them into a debate to which they may otherwise pay no attention.” In short, controversy and, by implication, doubt, sells stories.

There are at least two ways scientists might work more effectively with mainstream media.  One is to be selective about which outlets and journalists they work with and/or endorse (e.g., avoiding those committed to the Disseminator or Adversarial models). Another is to alert and educate journalists about the downside of controversy-mongering.  For instance, presenting conflicting views from two apparently equally authoritative sources may sell stories, but it also decreases credibility and trust in both sources (Smithson, 1999). Erosion of public trust is a major contemporary issue for scientists and governments, so there are grounds for scientists and policy makers to collaboratively militate against misguided media practices.

A third possibility, one that increasing numbers of scientists and scholars have invested in, is using or creating alternative media (mainly those spawned by the internet). Can the newer media do better?  It may be too early to tell. Unregulated forums probably won’t, because they will allow all comers and may thereby fall prey to the indiscriminant “balance” problem. Regulated forums might, especially if their contributions come from domain experts. However, they may suffer from preaching to the converted unless their ambit is sufficiently inclusive.  The greater interactivity of the new media and the emergence of appropriately regulated but fairly inclusive forums seem to hold the greatest promise of enabling genuine controversies to be debated and false controversies to be put to rest.

An earlier version of this article was posted on BestThinking on the 27^th of October 2010.

References

Michaels, D. (2005). Doubt is their product. Scientific American, 292 (6), 96-112.

Michaels, D. (2008). Doubt is their product: How industry’s assault on science threatens your health. New York: Oxford University Press.

Oreskes, N. and Conway, E. M. (2010). Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth from tobacco smoke to global warming. New York: Bloomsbury.

Plimer, I. (2009). Heaven and Earth: Global warming—The missing science.. Lanham, MD: Taylor Trade Publishing.

 Proctor, R.N. (1995). Cancer wars: How politics shapes what we know and don’t know about cancer. New York: Basic Books.

Schultz, C. (2010) http://colinschultz.wordpress.com/2010/08/03/tips-for-young-science-journalists-a-crash-course-on-the-major-issues-in-the-field/.  Accessed 16 May 2011.

Smithson, M.  (1980). Interests and the growth of uncertainty.  Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 10:  157-168. 

Smithson, M. (1999) Conflict aversion: preference for ambiguity vs. conflict in sources and evidence. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79: 179-198.

Stocking, H. and Holstein, L. (2009) Manufacturing doubt: journalists’ roles and the construction of ignorance in a scientific controversy. Public Understanding of Science, 18: 23-42.

Quick, consider the following: All polar bears are animals. Some animals are white. Therefore, some polar bears are white. Is this conclusion logically implied or not? There is a 75% chance that you might endorse this conclusion despite it being logically false. This instantly becomes apparent if you replace “white” in the foregoing with “brown”.

You just witnessed a fundamental aspect of human cognition. Our logical reasoning is often compromised by irrelevant features such as the familiarity of white (but not brown) polar bears. This frailty is routinely exploited by those who are trying to confuse the public about the well-established scientific fact that the Earth is warming due to human CO2 emissions.

There is an upside to this frailty, however: Whether due to mere ignorance or ideologically-driven mendacity, denier illogic can be revealed for the nonsense that it is by translating it into an everyday equivalent. Consider the famous denialist two-step, often uttered in the same breath: “it’s not warming … but it’s natural variation.” This is logically equivalent to the claim: “decaying teeth don’t exist … but they fall out naturally.” No one would place much faith in that dental opinion and no one should place any trust into equivalent illogic when it comes to climate.

In other instances, compromised reasoning can be more subtle, especially when couched in calm and civil terms, as in a recent article in these pages. At first glance, Emeritus Professor Paltridge makes very reasonable points, for example by noting that some skeptics just like being a nuisance and that some of their scientific arguments are “hairy”.

Alas, the pernicious illogic that is lurking beneath the veneer can be revealed in its stark menace by translating the argument made about climate change into the context of HIV and AIDS. In translation, the principal premises of the article are as follows: (1) The medical community is polarised about whether or not HIV causes AIDS. (2) On the one hand there is the establishment that endorses this link, on the other hand there are some sceptical but reputable scientists, and the scientists in the middle say little. (3) Some vocal medical researchers insist that true science can only be found in peer-reviewed medical journals. (4) A situation has developed that is reminiscent of religion in the Middle Ages, in which only establishment theologians can do medical science. (5) The establishment should be expected to bridge the divide between the two sides, because it must be remembered that (6) most new ideas in research come from the outside. (7) The first step is for establishment medical scientists to acknowledge the material that is emerging on reputable homeopathic blogs, which after all (8) have access to a store of enthusiastic labour. (9) Medical researchers need to be positive and helpful when identifying errors in some of the more extreme homeopathic ideas.

This chillingly surreal narrative is far from hypothetical. Precisely this form of AIDS denial—for denial is what it is—was embraced by the former government of President Mbeki in South Africa. Although the U.S. National Academy of Sciences expressed the scientific consensus in 1988 succinctly as “…the evidence that HIV causes AIDS is scientifically conclusive,” Mbeki’s government rejected that consensus, called Western medicine “racist”, and instead treated AIDS with garlic and beetroot rather than anti-retroviral drugs.

A recent peer-reviewed Harvard study estimated that this denialism caused more than 330,000 fatalities. For that, Mbeki and his ilk are now held in richly deserved contempt around the world.

Let us return to climate change. In 2010, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences expressed the scientific consensus on climate change succinctly by calling it a “settled fact” that the Earth is warming due to human activity. It is not surprising, therefore, that 97% of domain experts accept that fact, which is supported by an almost unimaginably overwhelming body of evidence in the peer-reviewed literature.

In light of those facts, Professor Paltridge’s view of a “polarization” in the scientific community, in which there are scientists in the “middle” who “say little” and skeptics outside the “establishment” who are “reputable” appears misguided. Worse—it is tantamount to celebrating as heroes the few seemingly-credentialed individuals in the medical community who abused their academic privileges by feeding AIDS denial through bizarre publications or by side-stepping peer review altogether.

No, the handful of AIDS denialists within the medical community are not heroes. On the contrary, they have blood on their hands. In light of current WHO estimates of 150,000 annual fatalities from climate change, any appeal to those chimerical “reputable” skeptics runs a similarly grave moral risk. Posterity is likely to judge that stance at least as harshly as AIDS denial.

Finally, what about those “reputable” skeptic blogs, such as WattsUpWithThat, recommended by Professor Paltridge? What about their enthusiastic followers?

The plethora of content provided by WattsUpWithThat defies summary in a few words, although it is nicely illustrated by the considerable effort this blog expended on a photograph of Professor Ray Bradley taken in a hallway at the University of Massachusetts. The backdrop to this picture happened to be a large graph of ice-core data affixed to the building’s wall. The “reputable” blog thereupon spent several frantic days on the alleged shortcoming of this incidental backdrop to a photo: In the end, enthusiastic followers sought to strip Professor Bradley of all scientific credibility based on the presumed graphical impropriety of … a wall in a university building.

It is difficult to see any merit in such verbiage other than to reveal the obsessions of the originator. And this may explain why pre-emeritus scientists do not see fit to devote part of their 80-hour work weeks to patiently defending their university’s hallways against assault by a crowd that almost defies parody.

Sometimes, building bridges in times of conflict is a valiant and commendable endeavour. But there are other times, readily evoked by the name Neville Chamberlain, where the attempt to seek reconciliation is inadvisable because it misjudges the situation.

Peer-review and blog frenzy over irrelevant photographic backdrops cannot be bridged or reconciled. This realization must now be dawning on the proprietor of WattsUpWithThat, who has just published in a reputable peer-reviewed journal in collaboration with various academics. It will come as no surprise that this paper has largely reaffirmed the work of NASA, NOAA, and countless scientists by concluding that there is a robust warming trend in the U.S. temperature record. This conclusion is the precise opposite of the many years of incessant caterwauling by WattsUpWithThat, which built its enthusiastic audience—but no scientific reputation—on claims that warming is merely an artifact of bad thermometers.

So where do we go from here?

The answer is simple.

In South Africa, a new President was elected in 2008. On her first day in office, the new Health Minister, Barbara Hogan, expressed shame at her predecessor’s denial of science and declared: “The era of denialism is over completely.” On that day, health officials in South Africa jettisoned the garlic and beetroot and the denialist blogs. On that day, South Africans embraced the Western medical “establishment” and its life-saving antiretroviral drugs developed by research that subjected itself to peer review rather than to the noise of the blogosphere.

All we have to do is catch up with South Africa.

Climate Change “is the greatest market failure the world has seen”

       -Sir Nicholas Stern

This analysis and other similarly dire predictions have stimulated decision makers in many countries to consider new approaches to energy policy.  The daunting challenge they face, has been to make the cost of renewable energy competitive with heavily-subsidised conventional energy. In the past, householders or energy companies who wanted to install wind turbines or solar panels have been faced with lengthy pay-back times. They have been forced to make a choice based on ethics rather than economics.  Without increased consumer demand and political measures to facilitate access to the market, manufacturers of, for example, wind turbines and solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, cannot produce the unit volumes needed to bring prices down and drive technological innovation. (Access economics, 2008)

The Feed-In Tariff (FIT) has proven to be the most effective policy instrument in overcoming these barriers. Led by Germany and Spain this simple, relatively low-cost mechanism has turned several European countries into world leaders in the renewables sector. Under a feed-in tariff mechanism, eligible renewable electricity generators (which can include homeowners and businesses) are paid a premium price for any renewable electricity they produce. Typically utilities are obligated to take the electricity and pay them. (Bender et al, 2009).

Close to 75% of the world’s residential solar photovoltaic (PV) installations have occurred with the support of national, state or provincial FIT policies. (Solangi et al, 2011). In 2009, 45 countries and 28 states/provinces/territories had FIT programmes in place. (International Energy Association, 2010)

Gross or Net?

There are two metering options for solar PV FIT programmes: 1) net metering (also referred to as net export, or import/export metering), and 2) gross metering.

Under a net metering scheme, residential energy generators are paid for the net quantity of electricity exported to the grid after accounting for in-home consumption. In other words, Net Export = Gross Production – Household Load.  Western Australia currently offers its incentive on a net export basis.

By contrast, under a gross metering system (as in the ACT and NSW), PV owners receive the premium tariff for all electricity produced by their systems (whether consumed at home or exported). They then pay the retail price for the electricity they actually consume.

It is interesting to note that gross FITs schemes appear to have become the worldwide default standard. Of the 45+ international examples of feed-in tariff schemes, Australia appears to be among the very few, if not the only country to adopt this form of metering for feed-in tariffs (McKinsey & Co, 2009)

The Consumer’s Perspective

Gross FIT schemes are widely believed to be a more effective policy instrument than Net in achieving customer uptake of solar PV renewable energy technology; (International Energy Agency 2010, World Futures Council 2008) for reasons that are discussed below.

• Ease of understanding – Most consumers are able to more accurately estimate the payments they are likely to receive under a gross scheme and correspondingly the expected payback period for an installation. This is because the payments under a gross scheme can be estimated without needing to know consumption patterns.
• Higher return on investment – Because the producer receives the premium tariff for all electricity produced, a gross FIT produces higher returns to the installer of a renewable energy generator, making investment in renewable energy more attractive
• Less discriminatory – Gross FITs avoid discriminating between high peak load onsite users (small businesses, retirees) and those who would benefit from a net metered regime (mainly households who work during the day and consume PV electricity away from their generation site).
  • Behavioural impacts – Under a gross FIT, the householder has to buy the electricity they use at the regular tariff, so they are still prompted to make savings through energy conservation.
  • Investment certainty – A gross FIT allows investment decisions to be made with more certainty. Take as an example the following situation where an installer is setting out the benefits to a household: When selling a system the installer can easily say; “If you install this you will generate around $1,000 or $1,500 a year”. Because net metering depends on the behaviour of the householders, such certainty is not possible.

Net Feed In Tariffs are not without their supporters, some of their arguments are outlined below;

• Ease of installation – Net FITs allow installation without the need for new metering. However a new or replacement meter costs around $200 (Bradley Shone, Energy Policy Manager, Alternative Technology Association, Proof Committee Hansard, 9 September 2008, p. 12), while the total solar PV installation cost is likely to be upward of $8000. Thus is a  small component of total outlays.
• Information advantages – It has been argued that one of the benefits of a net feed in tariff is that consumers become more conscious of their electricity consumption habits. This is arguable.

In sum, net FIT schemes appear to lack several key attributes of successful consumer policy instruments. I.E. concrete, salient examples with cost/benefit information (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) designed to be as specific, detailed, and practical as possible (Stern 1976; Dresner 1990; Dennis et al. 1990) so as to allow participants to know the advantages and disadvantages of each measure and feel in control of their choices (Dennis et al. 1990).

Furthermore, with net metering this difficulty in gauging energy usage may actually serve to undermine the core purpose of FIT schemes, that is to stimulate energy conservation; as households using net metering cannot actually determine their own energy consumption, and therefore cannot use the meter to guide energy saving measures. (Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2007)

What are the others doing? – policies and responses worldwide

Ontario’s recently commenced renewable strategy and residential Gross FIT scheme is among the most ambitious globally. The provincial government is on track to close all its coal-fired power plants by 2014. The 694 large scale FIT contracts announced to date are expected to create 30,000 direct jobs and attract an estimated CAN $14 billion in private sector investment. (Pietruszko,2006)

In Germany, a Gross FIT program has been offered to PV operators since 2001. The success of the FIT along with solar PV purchase subsidies have enabled Germany to reach its goal of a 12.5% renewable energy supply three years early, in 2007. (Pietruszko,2008)

The rapid growth in Germany post 2004 (Figure 1) can be seen in response to a raft of new more attractive policies introduced in that same year. In Spain the first FIT scheme was launched in 2005 and then upgraded in 2007. (International Energy Association, 2008) In Japan meanwhile, between 1996 and 2007 subsidies of around AUS$2400 were allocated by the Japanese government for systems up to 10kw. With the conclusion of the subsidy programme, Japan did experience a reduction in demand from 290 MW in 2006 to 210 MW in 2007. (International Energy Association, 2008). Perhaps as a reaction to this drop in household demand for solar PV, the Japanese government instated a gross feed in tariff of AUS $80c/kwt in 2009 for residential solar generators.

Within the United States, California is recognised as one of the pioneering states in the adoption of FIT policy instruments for solar PVs. In an interesting format, generators can choose between a 10, 15 or 20 year contract and can opt for a gross FIT or Net Fit themselves.

Figure 1 also shows how Australia’s share of the solar PV market has fallen from around 7 per cent in 1992 to 1 per cent in 2007. (International Energy Agency, 2008)

If only! – Designing an optimal gross national FIT

Based on experience from overseas FIT schemes, and modelling by Access Economics; the Clean Energy Council PV Directorate (2008) maintains that FITs schemes should include the following principles:

• Long Term. Long term commitment to the programme such as rates guaranteed for a minimum of 15 – 20 years
• Gross Metering. That is, the feed in tariff rate is applied to all of the energy generated from the solar PV system not just the energy that is surplus to the investors needs.
• All sectors. Open to all sectors not just the residential sector but community halls, distribution centres, churches, shopping centres, factories etc.
• FIT Rates and Payback Periods. Access Economics modelling indicates that to facilitate a 10 year pay back on investments, a FIT of 75c/KWh would be required in year one of the scheme, falling to 62c/KWh for units installed in year 20 of the scheme (2028).

It should be noted that within Australia, no state or territory deploys a FIT scheme with the aforementioned attributes.

References & Further Reading

Access Economics (2008) The Economics of Feed-in Tariffs for solar PV in Australia Report by Access Economics Pty Limited for Clean Energy Council.

Ariely, D. and J. Heyman (2004) ‘Effort for payment: a tale of two markets’, Psychological Science, 15 (11), pp.787-93

Ayoub, J., 2007. Co-operative Programme on Photovoltaic Power Systems, National Survey Report of PV Power Applications in Canada 2008. International Energy Agency (IEA), May 2008, 1-21.

Cesario, J., Grant, H., Higgins, E. T. (2004). Regulatory fit and persuasion: Transfer from “feeling right.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 388-404.

Dennis, M, Soderstrom, J, Koncinski, W.S  and Cavanaugh, B. (1990). Effective dissemination of energy-related information: applying social psychology and evaluation research. American Psychologist (October): 1109-1117.

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Climate change as a symptom of the growth disease

Steve Smith, 13^th May 2011

I am more occupied by the challenges of growth than of climate change.

Why?

I accept that climate change is an urgent and potentially catastrophic problem.

But,

I fear that simplistic solutions such as promoting electric cars and wind farms will achieve little, except a different kind of growth, which will not only require fossil fuel energy, but may even stimulate consumption of fossil fuels.

As long as we are growing, fossil fuel consumption will continue apace (especially coal, since oil production has peaked and prices are escalating).

Coal consumption is increasing. Coal fired power stations continue to increase.

Australia and USA set to grow by 20M and 100M consumers

Economic migration is another form of growth.

Increasing costs of basic commodities raises the cost of living, pushes more people into poverty, increases the cost of finding and refining resources, transport, food etc.

The price of food is tied to the price of oil.

We see increasing civil unrest (which exacerbates some of the above problems, pushing prices up faster).

Efficiency gains are unrealistic – Jevons was correct.

See a truly excellent article by David Owen of ‘The New Yorker’

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/12/20/101220fa_fact_owen

We cannot solve today’s problems with yesterday’s thinking

Simply growing a new energy sector is yesterday’s thinking.

Resources crunch

We cannot see or feel the effects of climate change (we rely on what the scientists tell us).

But we can see and feel the effects of increasing food prices, air travel, energy, water.

And the effects on jobs.

People will not act on climate change until it affects them directly. It is almost impossible to persuade people to treat the symptoms that have not yet revealed themselves.

Carbon pricing is currently tokenistic. We see how unacceptable a tax is to the Australian public and businesses. Exemptions, refunds or moving the emissions offshore are the order of the day (ie. achieving almost nothing).

But can people be persuaded to cut consumption and growth?

Most of today’s immediate problems are the consequence of too many people consuming too much stuff, not a problem of climate change.

Instead of trying to grow the economy by building new infrastructure, which will increase demand for more fossil fuels and resources, can a decrease in growth and reduced demand for resources slow the consumption of fossil fuels?

Can the resources crunch come to the rescue of climate change?

Treating the growth disease that we can all see developing, may be more achievable than trying to treat one symptom that has not yet had an impact on anyone. It might even effectively treat the climate change symptom.

Instead, most people advocate developing alternative energy in the hope that it can maintain current lifestyles and growth. But it cannot because of the resources crunch (see my previous STW entry).

Pushing for alternative energy sources is like bailing a boat with a hole in the bottom. We still sink. We still consume fossil fuels.

A new way forward

People and society should be educated about the limits of resources and how this will dictate future lifestyles. Not be told that non-fossil fuel energy will come to the rescue to sustain current life styles.

Continued growth and material wealth is not possible.

A future that does not depend on materialism and possessions is very appealing.

A future where what we do is more important than what we have.

What we do for each other, rather than what others can do for us.

Too Utopian? Unrealistic?

Does today’s lifestyle bring fulfilment and wellbeing?

How might changes in values be driven?

We have seen how cigarette smoking has shifted from the norm, to undesirable, to repulsive.

We may see similar responses to materialism. People who flaunt their wealth with expensive cars and big houses may become subjects of scorn.

Challenging circumstances can bring out the best in people.

Are there things that individuals can do to cut consumption and hence energy demand?

Stop flying overseas for holidays

Buy local produce

Eat less meat

Value services rather than goods

Job sharing

Stay-at-home parents

Stop buying gadgets

Community projects

Grow food

Technological solutions (the ‘ideal home’ concept of electronic management) is not the answer, but changes in values and expectations are.

Ask the neighbour, don’t buy a gadget.

Buy a small car and use it little. Don’t buy a hybrid.

Live in a small (but beautiful) house.

Play sports, don’t buy a wii, listen to a band, don’t buy a music gadget.

Share things.

Before you buy something, ask how it will improve the quality of your life or anyone else’s. Ask what effect it has on the planet (eg what resources and energy were used to make it?)

We still need modern technology:

Internet allows us to work at home, communicate

Health care

Education

Advanced public transport

Conclusion

The resources crunch (increased prices, shortages and world unrest) will hit hard very soon.

This will be the time when society will accept change. Even willingly.

We should be prepared. Have sensible solutions ready.

Not give society false hope of technological or economic fixes to sustain the unsustainable consumption and growth.

Modern humans have rapidly changed the conditions that were prevalent during their emergence as a species some 200,000 years ago. For tens of thousands of years humans lived within the constraints of their bioregions and made adaptive adjustments to climatic and biophysical changes. Within the last 10,000 years, humans have successfully colonised nearly every type of ecosystem and bioregion on the planet.

The main source of energy available to humans within this evolutionary context was ‘people power’, the energy gained from the food hunted and gathered within given bioregions. The effort needed to gather essential nutrients for life roughly equalled the energy gained from such enterprise. As a consequence, human ecology lived within the thermodynamic constraints of place and human health in all of its dimensions was an expression of such limitations (Boyden, 1999).

However, as human cultural, agricultural and technological evolution proceeded, the ability to leapfrog the limitations of place grew exponentially. Surpluses in food production, and later, virtually every form of productive capacity, has been associated with a number of problems with the human-nature relationship. Homo sapiens has moved from a local patch disturbing species (Rees, 2000) to a species that now disturbs not only the biosphere, but also the global atmosphere. The human health impacts of such a transition have been well-documented (McKewon, 1988; Boyden, 1999; McMichael, 2001). The so-called ‘diseases of affluence’ such as heart disease, obesity, hypertension, diabetes and some forms of cancer have emerged within a post scarcity society (Hetzel and McMichael, 1987). Overriding all of this is global warming and climate change where potentially irreversible, catastrophic impacts are possible for ecosystem and human health (physical and mental) at a planetary scale (Aron and Patz, 2001; McMichael, 2001; Albrecht, et al 2007).

Ecological Footprint Analysis

Ecological Footprint Analysis (EFA) has been developed as a relatively new tool to assess the impact and sustainability of humans on planet earth (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996; Lenzen and Murray, 2001; WWF Living Planet Report, Global Footprint Network). EFA differs from other measures of human impacts in that it offers a comparative insight into aggregate resource consumption and waste production at a number of different scales. By converting all forms of resource consumption and waste assimilation into a universal unit of biologically productive land (hectares per person) needed to produce those resource and waste assimilation services, meaningful comparisons can be made between the resource intensity of lifestyles worldwide.

What is interesting about EFA is that, in general, it shows that people in rich countries (also those with high per capita use of fossil fuels), generally have the largest Ecological Footprint (EF). This information, combined with other data generated on the health problems of humans, gives us some compelling information about just how intimately the ecological footprint, health status, lifestyle and sustainability are connected. Using publicly available data from the WWF in their Living Planet Report 2010 and the World Health Organisation data on obesity it is possible to see more clearly this connection.

I have put into Table 1 (below) data on some of the largest and smallest national per person ecological footprints in the world and their corresponding rates of obesity for females. The ecological footprint for Nauru has not been calculated. The measure of obesity is body mass index (BMI) where, according to the WHO as the weight in kilograms divided by the square of the height in metres (kg/m2 ). A BMI over 25 kg/m2 is defined as overweight, and a BMI of over 30 kg/m2 as obese (http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/ ).

Table 1 also shows how an estimate of a ‘fair earth share’ of available resources can be illustrated. Current best estimates are that given the amount of biologically productive land available on this earth, plus the land needed to assimilate wastes such as carbon dioxide, there is approximately two hectares of land per person if all 7.0 billion people on earth were to have an equal share of biologically productive and useful land. The data also show that a number of countries have ecological footprints near 10 hectares per person which translates into approximately 3-4 planets worth of biologically productive land if universalised.

A Heavy Footprint and Health

While I do not wish to argue that there is a simple causal relationship between per person EF and obesity levels expressed as BMI, it is clear that countries with a high EF generally also have a high percentage of people with a BMI defined by the WHO as obese. The converse is also immediately obvious in countries with a very small EF. People in the Pacific Island nations defy this trend in that they have, in, for example, Nauru , about 80% of the female population clinically defined as obese, yet traditionally they had a national ecological footprint that was hardly measurable. However, studies undertaken on obesity in the Pacific suggest that rather than caused primarily by genes or a traditional cultural preference for largeness, clinically defined obesity is a new problem connected to the importation and consumption of high fat and energy dense food, increased use of technology, abandonment of food production and with all of the above, decreased physical activity (Obesity in the Pacific [PDF]).

When the major components of the ecological footprint are broken down it is clear that one of the largest segments is that contributed by food inputs and outputs. The net result of populations (or segments of populations) that over consume food and nutrition while at the same time reducing their physical activity levels is increasing obesity (with attendant chronic disease), an ever increasing ecological footprint and non-sustainability.

Reducing our ecological footprint is vital for planetary and human health. The cheap (until Peak Oil) and freely available energy in a fossil fuel based economy is now, ironically embodied in humans in the form of obesity. In effect, humans are eating fossil hydrocarbon energy and converting their ‘high-hydrocarb’ diet to body fat.

The connections between a high-hydrocarb diet, obesity and climate change may not seem immediately obvious; however, they both produce unfortunate consequences for the health of people and the planet.

References

Aron, J., and Patz, J. (eds) (2001) Ecosystem Change and Public Health: A Global Perspective, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press.

Albrecht, G. (2005). Solastalgia: A new concept in human health and identity. PAN: Philosophy Activism Nature (3), 41-55.

Albrecht, G, Sartore, G et. al. (2007) Solastalgia: The distress caused by environmental change, Australasian Psychiatry. Vol. 15, Special Supplement, pp. 95-98.

Boyden, S. (1987) Western Civilization in Biological Perspective: Patterns in Biohistory, New York, Oxford University Press.

Hetzel, B., and McMichael, T. (1987) The LS Factor: Lifestyle and Health, Ringwood, Penguin.

Lenzen, M., and Murray, S. (2001). A modified ecological footprint method and its application to Australia. Ecological Economics 37(2): 229-255.

Living Planet Report 2010 (WWF). http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/all_publications/living_planet_report/ (accessed May 9 2011)

McKeown, T. (1988) The Origins of Human Disease, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

McMichael, T. (2001) Human frontiers, environments and disease, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Obesity in the Pacific http://www.wpro.who.int/publications/pub_9822039255.htm (accessed May 9 2011)

Rees, W. (2000) Patch Disturbance, Ecofootprints, and Biological Integrity: Revisiting the Limits to Growth (or Why Industrial Society Is Inherently Unsustainable) in Pimental, D. et al Ecological Integrity: Integrating Environment, Conservation, and Health, Washington, D.C. Island Press, pp. 139 – 156.

Wackernagel, M and Rees, W (1996) Our Ecological Footprint, Gabriola Island, New Society Publishers.

WHO 2010 https://apps.who.int/infobase/Comparisons.aspx/ (accessed May 9 2011)

Clive Hamilton makes a strong case in favour of a radical environmentalism. Citing the suffragettes and the U.S. civil rights movement as precedent, he proposes a similar radicalism as the way forward for the environmentalist movement, and in particular for stimulating long overdue action on climate change.

There is much support for this notion: after decades of incrementalism, the world’s failure to deal with climate change does seem to call for radical action. And the history of civil rights movements and the struggle against apartheid provide ample precedent for the position that “asking nicely” achieves nothing whereas radically-democratic actions—including acts of civil disobedience—have a greater likelihood of success.

Nonetheless, a few questions remain that deserve further examination, in particular relating to the precedents cited by Hamilton. Although few would doubt the ethical integrity and ultimate success of the civil rights movement and the suffragettes, I am less certain whether they can serve as strong precedents for the situation presently confronting the environmental movement.

First, whereas the people driving the civil rights movement and the suffragettes were personally and immediately affected by the injustices they fought, the same cannot be said about current environmentalists. By and large, no one in the environmental movement suffers discrimination or physical abuse just for being who they are—and few Australians are personally harmed or injured by climate change as yet. This may deprive the environmental movement of the purely visceral motivating force that inspired other movements in the past.

Second, an important underlying emotion of the civil rights movement arguably was one of hope. Hope combined with the quest for justice. A dominant emotion driving the suffragettes likewise was hope. Hope combined with the quest for justice. Alas, the climate crisis has not evoked (much) hope. A recent CSIRO survey of 5000 Australians (Leviston & Walker, 2010) revealed that people who thought that climate change was not occurring or only part of natural variation (an attitude that was found to predominate among Liberal voters) responded to mention of climate change with irritation. Those who accepted the climate science (primarily Labor and Greens voters) responded with fear. Fear and irritation, unlike hope, are negative emotions and both are potentially paralyzing rather than inspiring. (To be sure, the same survey also found hope among frequently cited emotions, but it appeared to take a backseat to irritation and fear.)

Third, for the civil rights movement and the suffragettes, the path forward was clear: Outlaw discrimination, give women the right to vote. For the climate and environmental movement, the path forward is far less clear; the demand to “decarbonize the economy” is ridiculously more complex and fuzzy than “I want to vote.” And even among those who want action, there is debate about which technological path to pursue—there are some proponents of nuclear power and some who insist on alternative energies.

Where does this leave us?

Are we at the threshold of a new civil rights movement that ushers in an era of clean energy and a reasoned response to the climate crises and resource depletion? Or will irritation and fear gain the upper hand and unleash the beast of populism that seeks to blame someone for all real and imagined problems—from climate scientists to asylum seekers?

This appears to be an open question.

It also appears to be an open question how best to tip the balance towards action and away from static populism.

On the one hand, a small-scale incrementalism which is based on the notion that a few tweaks, a little bit of tax, and compensation for the coal industry can do the trick is utterly unrealistic in light of the magnitude of the problem.

On the other hand, radical action that is bound to alienate at least some segments of society may stoke the fires of populism while failing to achieve action—in part because of the three problems just noted.

This conundrum appears insoluble at the moment. However, perhaps incremental steps can at least shift the conversation to a different frame; from the current nonsensical and infantile noise in which fundamentals of physics are “debated” by anyone from broadcasters to Cardinals, to a different frame in which the noise has been replaced by baby steps of action.

Perhaps those baby steps can in turn instill the hope that is required before democratic radicalism can exert its legitimate role. But then again, perhaps the baby steps will remain just that— “green-washing” and a fig leaf behind which to hide inaction.

References

Leviston, Z. & Walker, I. A. (2010). Baseline survey of Australian attitudes to climate change: Preliminary report. CSIRO (Behavioural Sciences Research Group).