An alternative approach might be to compartmentalize the ETS by sector and/or greenhouse gas to ensure action on all fronts. Instead of a single catch-all commodity called “carbon” that equates many different things, there could be several commodities (eg. “fossil carbon”, “land carbon”, “chlorofluorocarbon”, etc), each with its own separate emissions caps and market. Companies would be allowed to exchange apples for apples, but not apples for oranges. Greatest priority (strongest cap, highest floor price) would be given to cutting the commodity with the most important role in climate change: fossil carbon. This compartmentalized emissions trading would allow each type of emissions to be reduced at the lowest credible cost.

Miscellaneous issues

Australia has delayed application of the latest science on the relative heat-trapping potential of greenhouse gases until 2017-18.[xv] It should be applied immediately so that present policy is based on the best available information.

Present measurement and accounting of fugitive emissions of methane from unconventional gas extraction is inadequate. Full measurement and accounting of these emissions should be mandated. There is evidence to suggest gas-fired electricity generation may actually be worse than coal-fired generation on a 20-year timescale when fugitive emissions are taken into account.[xvi]

The floor price should be reinstated (preferably at a higher level than the original $15/tonne) to help prevent the carbon price from crashing. The ceiling price should be removed because it limits the penalty for pollution.

Current rules allow liable companies to bank present carbon permits to use in the future, and borrow future permits to use in the present. This is unwise as it creates uncertainty in Australia’s emissions trajectory, and could result in a surplus of permits.

Emissions are counted on a facility-by-facility basis rather than company-by-company. I am concerned companies could avoid paying the carbon price by setting up a large number of small facilities each with small emissions.

It is often argued climate policy requires a choice between market mechanisms and regulatory ones, but that is a false dichotomy. A mix of markets and regulations are needed; indeed the carbon price already has both market-based and regulatory aspects. I am advocating a greater regulatory aspect to ensure the market aspect delivers an effective outcome. It would be unwise to leave too many greenhouse gas decisions to markets, because a market failure is driving the problem in the first place. On that basis, a climate policy is more likely to be effective the more limited its market aspects and the more restrictive its regulatory aspects. If markets are badly designed by governments then they will make the wrong investment decisions.

In the final part, I will argue for and suggest some complementary measures.

This is the fifth part in a series about the Caps and Targets Review being conducted by the Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) this year. Part 1 summarized the global climate crisis, Part 2 explained the importance of the review and how CCA should approach it, Part 3 outlined the role Australia should play in climate action, and Part 4 debunked the economic justifications for inaction. This part makes my central recommendations on emissions caps.

Emissions caps are intended to cut emissions as fast as possible, not to limit the pace of emissions cuts or guarantee property rights to go on polluting. They should be designed in such a way that they do not inadvertently limit the pace of emissions cuts, which would conflict with the intent of the policy. Beginning the systemic change in the economy necessary to move toward zero emissions is more important than meeting an arbitrary emissions target and timetable.

The carbon price is intended as a mandatory penalty for carbon pollution and an incentive to drive investment in zero-carbon technology and energy efficiency. It is not intended to drive investment in less carbon-intensive fossil fuels. A higher carbon price is better than a lower one, because the bigger the shock to the system, the more likely it is to drive behavior change. A weak emissions cap, or weak policy design, would cause the carbon price to crash to levels like present international carbon prices, undermining the incentive to invest in zero-carbon assets.

The Government’s present target of a 5% emissions reduction below 2000 by 2020 is meaninglessly weak given the urgency of rapid global emissions cuts. The 2050 target of an 80% emissions reduction below 2000 has far too long a timeframe: the 2010s is the critical decade for avoiding dangerous climate change.

Ross Garnaut’s method of allocating emissions targets[i] (on which the government has based its approach) effectively rewards Australia for having high per-capita emissions, rapid projected population growth, and rapid projected business-as-usual emissions growth (factors which if anything justify a more stringent target for Australia than for other countries); and limits Australia’s maximum ambition for no good reason. Garnaut further recommended the calculated target of 25% below 2000 by 2020 be conditional on a global agreement unlikely to materialize, which is unreasonable for the reasons explained in Part 3. Furthermore, Garnaut’s advocacy of international emissions trading makes a mockery of dividing the work into “fair shares”.

In contrast, CCA’s mandate puts no limit on the ambition of the targets it can recommend. It should recommend an emissions reduction trajectory fast enough to shift the political focus from meeting an inadequate 2020 target to slashing emissions in a single electoral term, to accelerate the pace of change and so the incumbent government can be held accountable for its targets. The emissions cap should decrease each year, and reach zero as soon as possible.

To be consistent with an emergency response to preserve a safe climate, and to be fair on developing countries, Australia would need to cut its emissions faster than the 6%/year global rate mentioned in Part 1.

CCA should recommend a rate of emissions reductions faster than, and certainly no slower than, the observed emissions reduction rate during the fixed price period (which will be assessed by a contemporaneous CCA review). It should also be faster than the projected emissions reduction rate in a scenario where the fixed carbon price continues and is complemented by other climate policies like the Renewable Energy Target (RET) and Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC). It should cause the carbon price to rise rapidly over time (ie. much faster than a few percent per year) to strengthen the signal to investors.

Yet another reason for ambitious targets is that the rapidly falling prices of renewable energy technologies make it much easier to cut emissions than was believed when the 5% target was set in 2008.

The targets recommended by the Review, if approved by Parliament, will lock in an emissions trajectory through to 2020. CCA must not make the mistake of recommending unambitious emissions caps, as such a mistake would be difficult, if not impossible, to correct for five or more years. Also, CCA should recommend amending the Clean Energy Act to clarify that carbon permits are not associated with property rights so that emissions caps can be tightened after they have been set.

To encourage voluntary actions, there must be a clear mechanism to tighten the emissions cap to account for verifiable voluntary emissions cuts, including emissions cuts from other federal, state, and local policies (ie. making those policies additional to the ETS). To prevent inertia, verified emissions cuts should be subtracted from the cap in the following year, not five years after they occur. Also, recalled permits should be cancelled instead of being reissued. Any possibility of overachieving or oversupply of permits should be welcomed as an opportunity to tighten the next year’s emissions cap.

In Part 6, I will make recommendations on the design of the carbon price mechanism.

This is the fourth part in a series about the Caps and Targets Review being conducted by the Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) this year. Part 1 summarized the global climate crisis, Part 2 explained the importance of the review and how CCA should approach it, and Part 3 outlined the role Australia should play in climate action. This part debunks the economic justifications for inaction.

The Australian government should not limit itself to least-cost mechanisms. Maximizing the scale, pace, and effectiveness of climate action is far more important than limiting the costs of action. Effective climate policies that help avoid enormous costs from climate change are preferable to climate policies that are cheap and ineffective.

The apparent costs of climate policies are short-term and greatly exaggerated while the external costs of CO₂ emissions are greatly underestimated and long-lived. Most of the costs of climate change are long-term, unquantifiable, worst-case, and non-market costs, which are not included in cost-benefit analyses of climate action like that of the Garnaut Review.[i] Also, many cost-benefit analyses use high discount rates to estimate the future costs of climate change, which is questionable both on ethical grounds and because it assumes economic growth can continue indefinitely. The true external cost of CO₂ emissions could be far higher than the current carbon price of $23/tonne, so high that practically any measures to move to a zero-carbon economy are worth taking.[ii]

Whenever someone tells you a policy is or isn’t cost-effective, ask “cost-effective based on which assumptions, over what time period, and for whom?” Emissions cuts that appear cheap can often be less credible than those with a higher upfront cost (I will elaborate on this point in Part 6). Contribution to the long-term structural change required to decarbonize the economy should be prioritized over apparent short-term cost-effectiveness. Arguments for economic efficiency are often used as excuses to undermine the intent of climate policies. Such efforts to minimize costs overlook that the cost of climate policies is (or at least is supposed to be) mainly paid by polluting companies: it’s like saying anti-tobacco legislation should be “least-cost” for tobacco companies.

Australian governments to date have tended to equate fossil fuel mining and export interests with the national interest. This misguided belief can be traced to a major mistake made in the 1980s in energy and trade policy, to stake Australia’s competitiveness on coal exports.[iii] Given the scale of the climate change threat, climate policy must not be subordinated to this mistaken goal.

The contribution of fossil fuels to the economy is overblown. Only 0.3% of Australian jobs are in coal mining. The majority of mining industry profits either go overseas or benefit only a small minority of Australians. The mining boom is driving up the Australian dollar and thereby destroying other industries. The mining sector did not prevent a recession, but in fact went into recession itself in 2009.[iv] In one sense, having high per capita emissions makes it easier for Australia to cut emissions than other countries, because there is more “low-hanging fruit”.[v] Even phasing out Australia’s coal exports would merely cause Australian GDP to double by 2031 instead of by 2030[vi], paling in comparison to the impacts of the several degrees of global warming associated with continuing demand for those exports.

Continuing to rely on fossil fuels would damage Australia’s future competitiveness. The fact that most fossil fuels are unburnable implies the global economy contains a “carbon bubble”. The valuation of fossil fuel companies is based on the assumption that their reserves will be burned. If we wish to avoid global catastrophe, that bubble must burst. When it does, more than $20 trillion worth of fossil fuel reserves will become stranded assets and the companies’ value will plummet.[vii] Environmentally unsustainable investments are ultimately also economically unsustainable. Those countries least reliant on fossil fuels will be most competitive in the future.

Australia can exit the fossil fuel business and instead export renewable energy technologies to the world. The relative importance of sectors in the Australian economy has always changed over time. Australia has vast renewable energy resources. It is possible for Australia to achieve 100% renewable energy by scaling up existing technologies.[viii] The price of renewables are falling exponentially as they are deployed, and can be further reduced by scaling up deployment, whereas the price of fossil fuels will ultimately rise as more and more countries price carbon and because they are non-renewable resources. Australian action can help change the relative prices of energy technologies globally.[ix]

The main contributor to electricity price rises has been gold-plated investment in transmission and distribution, not carbon pricing or other climate policies.[x] In contrast, climate change can be expected to cause massive increases to the cost of living, particularly food prices.

Domestic equity concerns should be addressed by assisting workers to transition into green jobs, not by handing out free permits to polluting companies. International equity concerns should be addressed by providing developing countries with funding and technology for climate change mitigation and adaptation, not by continuing to supply them with fossil fuels whose effects will hurt the world’s poorest worst of all. In many off-grid regions, solar PV is cheaper than fossil fuels.[xi]

The most important equity issue that CCA must consider is intergenerational. Young people like myself and future generations will suffer the impacts of the greenhouse gases emitted in the present. In this context, cost-benefit analyses tend to be inequitable because the use of discount rates effectively discounts the lives and living standards of future generations.[xii]

In Part 5, I will make my central recommendations on emissions caps.

This is the third part in a series about the Caps and Targets Review being conducted by the Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) this year. Part 1 summarized the global climate crisis, and Part 2 explained the importance of the review and how CCA should approach it. This part outlines the role Australia should play in climate action.

Australia should take an activist, not avoidant approach to climate change mitigation.

Ross Garnaut’s paradigm on Australia’s role in mitigating climate change, on which the Government has based its approach, is deeply flawed. A more realistic approach has been outlined in the Laggard to Leader report by Beyond Zero Emissions.[i] Australia should not limit itself to implementing its inadequate existing targets. In the absence of global climate action on the necessary scale, there is a need for ambitious unilateral leadership. Unilateral action is required to get a momentum for global action. All willing countries should aim to use every lever at their disposal to cut emissions within their sphere of influence to zero or near-zero in as short a timeframe as possible, much sooner than 2050. Australia can play an important role in this regard.

Ambitious action by Australia should not be conditional on international action. The UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”[ii] means Australia, as a developed country and high per-capita emitter, has the obligation and capacity to lead. Developing countries expect Australia to take unconditional ambitious action, and Australia’s lagging on climate change has damaged its international reputation.[iii] Also, conditional targets tend to be forgotten, particularly when the conditions are as unreasonable as they are at present.

Contrary to what some argue, Australia is not already leading the world with its $23/tonne carbon price. One reason for the low carbon price in the EU ETS is that many European countries have other climate policies (carbon floor prices, feed-in tariffs to support renewables, energy efficiency policies, transport policies, etc) which are taking the load off the ETS. Another reason is the EU ETS is badly designed (eg. its 2020 target requires no emissions cuts from present levels[iv]), which is no reason for Australia to follow their example. Regardless, no country on Earth is presently doing enough.

The position taken by the Australian government in UNFCCC negotiations has been largely counterproductive, including: its membership of the Umbrella Group of delayer countries; its prioritization of a post-2020 agreement over raising ambition as is urgently required; its insistence on a meaninglessly weak Kyoto Protocol second commitment period target for Australia; its unreasonable conditions for Australia to increase its Kyoto target; its refusal to countenance even conditional targets deeper than 25% below 2000; its pursuit of creative accounting rules for LULUCF (land use, land use change, and forestry) in both Kyoto commitment periods[v]; its intended reliance on international offset mechanisms; and its failure to provide finance for developing countries.

Instead, Australia should play a leading role in the UNFCCC. It should adopt an unconditional ambitious Kyoto target and stop advocating loopholes. Australia should acknowledge the “Australia clause” was an error committed by a previous government, propose an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to correct it, and stop using it in its national emissions accounting. Australia should lobby other countries to raise their ambition. Australia should consider the promised post-2020 agreement as a distant last priority unless the implementation date is brought forward, because it is extremely misguided to focus on the mirage of a possible future agreement to be implemented after the critical decade is over. Australia is also obligated to provide funding for climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.

Australia’s domestic greenhouse gas emissions are the 15^th largest in the world and the highest per capita in the OECD. Its cumulative historical emissions are the 14^th highest in the world.[vi] Domestic emissions excluding LULUCF have risen 30% since 1990[vii], further increasing Australia’s obligation. Domestic emissions not covered by the carbon price also need to be addressed, and further increase Australia’s obligation to slash covered emissions.

Domestic emissions are only one part of Australia’s contribution to climate change, which also includes emissions from the burning of fossil fuel exports (which dwarf domestic emissions) and emissions from the manufacture of imported products. In a world where national emissions targets do not add up to a safe global target, Australia shares responsibility for the emissions resulting from its exports and imports.[viii] These other contributions, as well as needing to be addressed themselves, further increase Australia’s obligation to slash domestic emissions.

Present climate policies around the world, including Australia’s, focus on constraining emissions only within their borders. Yet many of the world’s largest proposed fossil fuel projects involve carbon being mined in one country and burned in another.[ix] To target the problem at its source, much more attention must be given to constraining extraction of and global trade in fossil fuels.

Already the majority of Australia’s fossil fuels are exported. Any domestic emissions cuts will be far outweighed by planned exponential growth of fossil fuel exports.

The Australian government’s Energy White Paper[x] plans to facilitate the expansion of fossil fuel mining and export industries at a time when they must be phased out as fast as possible. Not only does the government want Australia’s enormous known fossil fuel reserves to be burned, it even promotes exploration for new ones. It boasts Australia is the world’s largest coal exporter and intends it will soon be the largest exporter of liquid natural gas (LNG). It projects Australia’s coal exports will double and its LNG exports quintuple by 2035 (and the total capacity of proposed coal export ports suggests the reality could be even worse).

Proposed Australian coal export projects collectively have been identified as the second largest proposed expansion of fossil fuel CO₂ emissions after Chinese coal mining.[xi] Demand for these exports depends on a scenario where the world takes no further climate action beyond what has been pledged in UN climate talks, leading to >4°C global warming, despite Australia claiming to support the globally agreed objective of limiting warming to <2°C.[xii]

All the above mean Australia’s present climate policies are completely inadequate.

In Part 4, I will debunk the economic justifications for inaction.

This is the second part in a series about the Caps and Targets Review being conducted by the Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) this year. Part 1 summarized the global climate crisis. This part explains the importance of the review and how CCA should approach it.

As a new and respected independent body, CCA has an opportunity to be a strong advocate for climate action, and challenge the assumptions that Australian governments have made about climate policy to date. The Caps and Targets Review should be treated not as a box-ticking exercise but as part of a vitally important global effort to avert climate catastrophe.

As currently designed Australia’s carbon price  is full of holes which render it ineffective, and Labor still clings to its meaningless target of a 5% reduction by 2020 (as I will expand on in later installments). However, assuming Gillard remains in power, CCA may provide an avenue for climate campaigners to persuade the government to set a real target and plug the holes.

This review is pivotal because it will recommend emissions caps for 2015-16 to 2019-20. The government will have to justify any deviation from CCA’s advice, and Parliament will have the chance to scrutinize and the power to disallow the government’s emissions caps (with a default one-year cap to apply if they are disallowed). At that time the Senate will still have its current composition, but Labor might be able to pass weak targets if the Liberals support it. If that happens, it is unclear whether it would be constitutionally possible to later reduce the number of emissions permits; any attempt to do so might be legally challenged as an acquisition of property.

Anthropogenic global warming is a complex and interconnected problem, so many issues technically outside the scope of the Caps and Targets Review are nevertheless relevant to its recommendations, hence are covered in this series. CCA’s thinking on emissions targets should be framed by crucial background and principles including the scale and urgency of the climate crisis, the political obstacles to climate action, the role which Australia should play, the baselessness of economic justifications for inaction, and the role which the carbon price should play. Even if CCA recommends ambitious targets, their effectiveness will be determined by other decisions about the design of the emissions trading scheme (ETS) which the carbon price will become in 2015, whether it is complemented by other climate policies, and whether other Australian contributions to climate change are also addressed.

There are several ways in which CCA could consider advice beyond the scope of the Review. Firstly, CCA’s mandate allows it to have regard to any relevant matter in deciding its recommendations. Secondly, there is nothing to stop the Review discussing topics outside its scope without making specific recommendations on them, to put its recommendations in context. Thirdly, I understand unscheduled reviews can be commissioned at any time and CCA can commission its own report if necessary, to research and make recommendations on vital matters outside the scope of scheduled reviews. Fourthly, a scheduled review could be brought forward. In particular, CCA is scheduled to review the carbon price mechanism in 2016. A 2016 review is too far away given the importance and urgency of getting climate policy design right, and the likelihood that emissions caps will be locked in until 2020. Therefore the date of that review should be brought forward to coincide with the Caps and Targets Review. CCA reviews should be as frequent as possible in order to accelerate climate action in the required timeframe. 

There are two possible sources of political interference that could prevent the completion of the Caps and Targets Review. Firstly, the Liberal Party has clearly stated it will abolish CCA if it wins the September election.[i] Also of concern is that Kevin Rudd has hinted that if reinstated as Labor leader he would consider an earlier transition to an ETS[ii], which could be construed as an intention to abolish CCA and set emissions caps without its advice. 

If climate change is not adequately addressed, the resulting impacts will almost certainly outweigh all other attempts to make Australia and the world a richer and/or more equitable society. Thus CCA’s main objective in all its reviews must be strengthening climate policies to accelerate the transition to a zero-carbon economy, not weakening them to reduce alleged short-term costs. The goal of accelerating mitigation of climate change must be paramount, overriding policy certainty, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, equity, foreign policy, and trade objectives where they are perceived to conflict.

Because of the need for fossil fuel phaseout, the fossil fuel industry cannot be trusted to participate in the design of climate policies. Misleading, self-serving arguments will be made to CCA by the fossil fuel lobby and the broader business lobby. While it could be argued these organizations have a right to lobby in their self-interest, their interests should not be put ahead of the public interest. They have known for many decades about climate change and the risk it poses to fossil fuel investments, and they should now face the consequences of the investment choices they have made without special treatment by governments. Past experience (eg. with carbon price compensation) shows that when the fossil fuel lobby secures concessions from government, however arbitrary, they become entitlements that are difficult to remove.[iii]

There is little point in trying to minimize policy uncertainty for investors. The reality is that climate policy will be subject to uncertainty for the foreseeable future, because it challenges powerful interests. However well climate policies are designed today, there is a danger they will be sabotaged by vested interests tomorrow, further emphasizing the need for decisive, rapid, and transformative action. The present focus on 2020 and 2050 targets makes it too easy for present governments to delay the heavy lifting and for future governments to undermine the policies of present ones (consider Australia’s failure to meet the Hawke government’s target of a 20% emissions reduction below 1988 levels by 2005[iv]).

Within this context, the best way to design climate policies is not to aim for investment certainty, but to send the strongest signals possible to penalize fossil fuel use and incentivize investment in zero-carbon technologies. CCA must not shy away from recommending policy changes to this end. The reason for the existence of a Climate Change Authority with regularly scheduled reviews is to provide regular opportunities to strengthen Australia’s climate policies and thus accelerate decarbonization over time.[v] If CCA continues to take the light touch approach it took in its Renewable Energy Target Review, it will be making itself irrelevant.

In Part 3, I will outline the role Australia should play in climate action.

The Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) is conducting a Caps and Targets Review this year. In this series I will explain why the review is important, outline what I think its recommendations should be, and attempt to deconstruct everything I believe is wrong with the Government’s climate policies and its underlying flawed beliefs about Australia’s role in climate action.

 Anthropogenic global warming is the largest and most urgent threat facing humanity today. There is an extremely urgent need for rapid emissions cuts to mitigate climate change. The extent of climate impacts decades, centuries and millennia from now will be determined by policy decisions taken in the near future. The Government’s own Climate Commission has identified the 2010s as the “Critical Decade” for climate change mitigation.[i]

 The latest climate science shows scientists have systematically underestimated the impacts of global warming (possibly because they have overcorrected in response to accusations of alarmism).[ii] The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC AR4) dramatically understates the problem, and AR5 can be expected to do the same because of the conservative nature and inertia of the IPCC process.

 There is a high risk that current estimates of climate sensitivity (the degree of global warming associated with a given increase in CO₂) are underestimates, as long-term feedbacks could become significant much sooner than expected.[iii]

 The atmospheric CO₂ level is currently approaching 400 ppm[iv] (compared to the preindustrial 280 ppm), which some climatologists argue is already too high to avoid tipping points for dangerous climate change. The safe level has been estimated as somewhere below 350 ppm, which is associated with ~1°C global warming above preindustrial.[v] The Earth has so far warmed by only 0.8°C[vi] (with further warming to come if atmospheric CO₂ remains at or above its present level[vii]), and already the Arctic appears to be crossing a tipping point, implying even 350 ppm is dangerous.

 Arctic sea ice is already melting faster in the real world than in the projections that will be included in AR5.[viii] Based on the trend in sea ice volume[ix] and one regional model[x], the Arctic in September could be completely sea-ice-free within a few years. By reversing the surface reflectivity of the northern polar region, the Arctic melt threatens to set off a chain reaction of tipping points, including collapse of the Greenland ice sheet and large-scale release of carbon from melting permafrost.[xi]

 The Greenland ice sheet is shrinking at an unprecedented and accelerating rate[xii], and recent modeling suggests the tipping point for total collapse could be a global temperature of around 1.6°C above preindustrial. The lower end of the range of possibilities is only 0.8°C, equal to today’s global temperature.[xiii]

 Permafrost is already starting to release carbon and could eventually emit at the same rate as deforestation, a finding which will not be included in AR5.[xiv]

 The last time the global temperature was ~1°C above preindustrial (in the Eemian interglacial age 125,000 years ago), the poles were several degrees warmer[xv], there was no summer sea ice in the Arctic[xvi], and sea level was 6-9 meters higher[xvii] [xviii] (meaning at least partial melting of the Greenland and/or West Antarctic ice sheets).

 The above findings imply we are already entering a period of dangerous climate change and there is very little time to avoid large feedbacks that could send climate change spiraling out of control.

 Because of the long lifetime of CO₂ in the atmosphere, before attempting to reduce its concentration, humanity must first stop emitting.[xix] To return CO₂ to <350 ppm requires cutting global fossil fuel emissions by 6%/year beginning in 2013 (followed by a global reforestation program later this century to start removing CO₂ from the atmosphere). If the world delays until 2020, the required emissions reduction rate would become 15%/year.[xx] At some point the required cuts become so steep they are impossible. In practical terms, everybody needs to cut fossil fuel emissions to zero or near-zero as soon as possible (and eventually less than zero). This means a global phaseout of fossil fuels.

 The countries of the world, including Australia, have agreed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to cut emissions fast enough to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”[xxi] and more recently to limit global warming to <2°C.[xxii] As explained above, 2°C is far from a safe target; however, the world is nowhere near on track to achieve even that. A possible global climate agreement has been delayed until at least 2020[xxiii] (and even then it is far from certain to be a globally binding regime[xxiv]). Present voluntary pledges under the UNFCCC, even assuming they are successfully implemented (which is not happening[xxv]), put the Earth on course for an unimaginably catastrophic >4°C global warming by 2100 (plus potentially large feedbacks and post-2100 warming).[xxvi] The “ambition gap” between these pledges and a 2°C pathway is growing instead of shrinking.

 There is very little time to shift away from business-as-usual. CO₂ is now rising by ~2 ppm/year[xxvii] and emissions are still accelerating: annual global fossil fuel CO₂ emissions have risen by 58% since 1990 and rose 2.6% in 2012.[xxviii] The vast majority of the Earth’s known fossil fuel reserves must be left in the ground if humanity is to even meet the agreed goal of limiting global warming to <2°C (let alone reduce CO₂ to <350 ppm).[xxix]

 Given the mounting evidence that even 1°C of warming is dangerous, it is extremely reckless to be complacent about the world’s present path to >4°C. Human civilization is unlikely to be able to adapt to anything like that level of global warming.[xxx] There is no precedent in human history: global temperature has varied by only a few tenths of a degree in the relatively stable climate of the past 10,000 years in which human civilization developed[xxxi] (though even such small global variation sometimes produced local climate changes large enough to cause or contribute to the demise of local civilizations[xxxii]). When the Earth was 5°C cooler 20,000 years ago, northern Europe and Canada were covered by ice sheets.[xxxiii] It has not been 4°C warmer since Antarctica was ice-free 35 million years ago.[xxxiv]

 It is impossible to predict the exact social impacts of climate change, but it is not difficult to imagine unprecedented migrations of hundreds of millions of people, resource wars, and even a collapse of global civilization.

 Some argue it is already too late to avert dangerous climate change. Even if that turns out to be correct, we must act now to limit the damage by decarbonizing the global economy as fast as possible. In case it is too late, geoengineering to remove CO₂ from the atmosphere on a large scale and/or cool the planet now also warrants serious consideration, albeit as a last resort.

 In Part 2, I will explain the importance of the Caps and Targets Review and how CCA should approach it.

This series was first posted on
Precarious Climate