Shaping Tomorrow's World

The scientific consensus on climate change: Still pivotal and more pervasive than ever

Thu, 16 May 2013 15:23:00 EST

Science is debate. It’s a debate that takes place at conferences or in the peer-reviewed literature, and scientific debates contribute to the error-correction process that has served science and the public well for a century or more.

Scientific debates have somewhat different rules from other debates. Unlike the raucous shouting matches in political arenas and schoolyards, scientific debates rely on rules of evidence and reasoned judgments. (And for the most part, scientific debates remain civil indeed, at least when compared to schoolyards, beer gardens, and parliaments.)

But that doesn’t mean that anything in science is open for debate. There is no debate about whether or not the Sun is at the center of the solar system, or whether there is gravity on Mars. Scientists don’t waste their time discussing issues on which a consensus has been established. Thus, the fundamental fact that human greenhouse gas emissions are warming the planet is no longer discussed at scientific meetings or in the peer-reviewed literature. Global warming is an accepted scientific fact.

There are two important aspects to this scientific consensus: The first one is psychological and relates to the impact of the consensus. The second relates to the way in which such a strong consensus emerges.

Turning to the psychology first, there is considerable evidence that the public is sensitive to the existence of a scientific consensus. If people perceive that scientists agree on an issue, then their own belief follows suit. This basic result has been replicated several times, including in my own research. It also explains why climate deniers expend considerable effort to negate the existence of that consensus, using the usual array of deceptive techniques such as pseudo-experts, or pointing to unreviewed blog-posts as “evidence” for their contrarian positions.

What is perhaps more notable is that the association between perceived consensus and the acceptance of scientific findings appears to be causal: in one of my studies, when members of the public were explicitly informed about the scientific consensus on climate change, they became significantly more likely to endorse the basic premise of global warming, and they attributed a larger share of the observed warming trend to human CO2 emissions, than people in a control condition who received no such information (and who underestimated the scientific consensus considerably.)

Underscoring the consensus in public communication of climate science is thus an important tool to counter the plethora of disinformation that is showered upon the public in some countries.

And that tool has become even more powerful today, with the publication of another peer-reviewed paper that examined the breadth of the scientific consensus on climate change. This new paper, by John Cook and colleagues, is particularly important because it underscores the source of the scientific consensus—namely its grounding in overwhelming evidence.

There has been evidence in the peer-reviewed literature already that more than 95 out of 100 climate scientists agree on the basic premise that human greenhouse gas emissions are warming the planet. Those figures were derived from several surveys of scientists or analyses of their publication record.

But why do virtually all climate scientists hold the opinion that the Earth is warming due to greenhouse gas emissions? Most members of the public have an intuition that scientists form their opinion on the basis of evidence. And so, if the evidence is only pointing in one direction, then the overwhelming majority of scientists around the world will come to the same conclusion. (The few individuals who think that the consensus is the result of a conspiracy to create the World Government can be safely ignored for present purposes.) But until now, tools for the visualization of that evidence have been limited.

This is where the new study by Cook et al. plays such a particularly important role: Going beyond previous surveys of climate scientists, Cook et al. performed a systematic review of the massive literature on climate change.

In a nutshell, they used a scientific search engine (ISI Web of Knowledge) to gather all papers published on ‘global climate change’ or ‘global warming’ between 1991 and 2011. This search returned a mind-boggling 12,000 papers (in round figures). Cook and colleagues then read all the abstracts of the papers and focused on those that expressed a position on the basic premise that humans are causing climate change. (The remainder addressed other issues such as new measurement techniques for polar ice and so on, and hence did not express a position in the abstract, although many endorsed the consensus position in the body of the paper.)

Of the roughly 4,000 papers that took a position, more than 97% endorsed the consensus.

To confirm their classification of the abstracts, Cook et al. additionally contacted the authors of the papers and asked the authors to classify their own article as to whether or not it endorsed the consensus. The result was the same: more than 98% of authors classified their articles as having endorsed the consensus.

Of all peer-reviewed papers expressing a position on human-caused global warming, 97-98% endorsed the facts that the Earth is warming due to greenhouse gas emissions.

This underscores what scientists had already known for at least a decade: That there is an overwhelming scientific consensus on climate change.

The work by Cook et al. goes beyond related precedents in three important ways: First, the number of papers and scientists sampled was far greater than the number used in any previous study on this subject. Second, owing to the large sample size, it was possible to trace the extent of the scientific consensus over time. This temporal analysis revealed that the consensus has not only been stable for the last nearly 20 years, but if anything, it has been increasing ever so slightly. Finally, the work by Cook et al. was based on a content analysis of the scientific literature, and scientists were asked to rate their own articles only for confirmation of that analysis.

Thus, the results of Cook et al. tell us not just about the existence of the consensus, but it also identifies the underpinning of the consensus—namely, the overwhelming evidence in the literature that points to the very clear fact that the globe is warming due to levels of CO2 in the atmosphere that have been unprecedented for several million years.

The results of the paper by Cook et al. are explained in more detail on a new website, www.theconsensusproject.com that was also launched today.

Recursive Fury: Facts and misrepresentations

Fri, 22 Mar 2013 11:00:00 EST

Our paper Recursive fury: conspiracist ideation in the blogosphere in response to research on conspiracist ideation has been published. The paper analyzed the public discourse in response to an earlier article by Lewandowsky, Oberauer, and Gignac (LOG12 for short from here on), which has led to some discussion on this blog earlier.

Refreshingly, the journal Frontiers makes all papers available for free with no paywall. Another unique feature of this journal is that readers can post comments directly beneath the abstract. Unfortunately this has led to the posting of a number of misrepresentations of the paper.

In this post, I’ll be addressing some of these misconceptions (but being careful to practise what I preach, will adopt the principles of the Debunking Handbook when I debunk the misconceptions). So here are some key facts about the Recursive Fury paper:

Conspiracy theorists are those who display the characteristics of conspiracy ideation

Yep, just stating the obvious, right? Recursive Fury establishes, from the peer-reviewed literature, the traits of conspiracist ideation, which is the technical term for a cognitive style commonly known as “conspiratorial thinking”. Our paper featured 6 criteria for conspiratorial thinking:

Nefarious Intent: Assuming that the presumed conspirators have nefarious intentions. For example, if person X assumes that blogger Y colluded with the New York Times to publish a paper damaging to X, then X presumes nefarious intent on the part of Y.
Persecuted Victim: Self-identifying as the victim of an organised persecution.
Nihilistic Skepticism: Refusing to believe anything that doesn’t fit into the conspiracy theory. Note that “conspiracy theory” here is a fairly broad term and need not involve a global conspiracy (e.g., that NASA faked the moon landing) but can refer to small-scale events and hypotheses.
Nothing occurs by Accident: Weaving any small random event into the conspiracy narrative.
Something Must be Wrong: Switching liberally between different, even contradictory conspiracy theories that have in common only the presumption that there is something wrong in the official account by the alleged conspirators. Thus, people may simultaneously believe that Princess Diana faked her own death and that she was assassinated by MI5.
Self-Sealing reasoning: Interpreting any evidence against the conspiracy as evidence for the conspiracy. For example, when climate scientists are exonerated of any wrong-doing 9 times over by different investigations, this is reinterpreted to imply that the climate-change conspiracy involves not just the world’s climate scientists but also the investigating bodies and associated governments.

We then went on to identify responses to LOG12 that exhibited these criteria. Our analysis was entirely based on whether or not public statements conformed to the criteria just listed—we made no comment on the merit of any criticism (except in cases where speculations were plain wrong).

A common misrepresentation of Recursive Fury is articulated by one commenter who says “conspiratorial ideation is defined in such a way that any criticism of LOG12, whether true or false, comes under that heading.” Actually, our criteria for conspiracist ideation come from a number of peer-reviewed examinations of conspiratorial thinking and have nothing to do with the substance of any criticism of LOG12. Our objective in Recursive Fury was to demonstrate that some of those criteria arguably applied to the public discourse surrounding LOG12. It does not follow that any criticism of LOG12 involves conspiratorial thinking. Of course not. But if some (not all) critics of a paper on the role of conspiratorial thinking in science denial engage in, well, conspiratorial thinking in response, that’s of scholarly interest.

The criteria for conspiracist ideation are applicable without regard to a statement’s truth or falsity. Recursive Fury is not about defending LOG12. On the contrary, this latest paper puts on the scholarly record many criticisms of LOG12 that had previously been limited to blogs, and it did so without evaluating or rebutting the substance of those criticisms. Some defence!

A few critics have complained that we didn’t include their methodological critiques of LOG12. Such critiques do not fit the conspiracist criteria, which is why they weren’t included. Those critics are welcome to submit rejoinders or comments on LOG12 to the journal in question.

A range of different conspiracy theories are posted in Recursive Fury

Recursive Fury reports and analyzes a number of conspiracy theories regarding LOG12. These range from “global climate activist operation” to “ringleader for conspiratorial activities by the green climate bloggers,” to Stephan Lewandowsky receiving millions of dollars to run The Conversation.

Some folk are able to overlook these many documented instances and insist that “There is no ‘conspiracy’ Mr. Lewandowsky - no matter how many times you try to manufacture one.” Recursive Fury documents a whole spectrum of conspiracy theories. As you get further into the paper, the conspiracy theories become broader and more extreme until you get to my personal favourite – maths professor Kevin Judd being the grand poobah of the “global climate activist operation” at the University of Western Australia. Somehow, those who insist "there are no conspiracies" manage to skip over entire sections of the paper.

It appears that “conspiracy denial” may be another phenomenon associated with climate denial. One blogger cannot see that his claim that climate scientists “colluded with government officials to avoid the law” is conspiratorial. Similarly, another blogger thinks accusing the University of Western Australia of being “a base for this global climate activism operation” is not a conspiratorial hypothesis because he didn’t use the word “conspiracy”.

The Supplementary Material is “raw data”

As well as the Recursive Fury paper, we also published Supplementary Material containing excerpts from blog posts and some comments relevant to the various observed recursive theories. In the paper, we characterise this as “raw data” - all the comments that we encountered that are relevant to the different theories. In contrast, the “processed data” are the excerpted quotes featured in the final paper, where we match the various recursive theories to the conspiracist criteria outlined above.

One misrepresentation of Recursive Fury is that we accuse Professor Richard Betts of the Met Office of being a conspiracy theorist because one of his quotes appears in our raw data. This inclusion of a relevant comment in the raw data of a Supplementary Material document was reported in hyperventilating fashion by one blogger as a spectacular carcrash. However, there is no mention of Professor Betts in our final paper and we are certainly not claiming that he is a conspiracy theorist. To claim otherwise is to ignore what we say about the online supplement in the paper itself. The presence of the comment in the supplementary material just attests to the thoroughness of our daily Google search.

Nevertheless, I can see how this misunderstanding arose. The Supplementary Material features the heading "Excerpt Espousing Conspiracy Theory" referring to the excerpted quotes that we pasted into the spreadsheet. In hindsight, the heading should have been "Excerpt relevant to a recursive theory", because the criterion for inclusion was simply whether or not they referred to one of the hypotheses. The analysis of conspiracist ideation occurred after that, and involved the criteria mentioned at the outset.

In this context, it is important to point out that one reason we made the raw data available is for other scholars to be able to cast an alternative interpretative light on the public discourse relating to LOG12. As we note explicitly in the abstract, it is possible that alternative scholarly interpretations can be put forward, and the peer-reviewed literature is the appropriate forum for such analysis.

LOG12 is in press

The original “Moon Landing” paper (referred to as LOG12) is still in press and due to be published soon. The fact that there was a long delay between acceptance and publication is one of the quirks of the peer-review publication process. Sometimes a paper can move from acceptance to publication with surprising speed (as was the case with Recursive Fury). Sometimes it can take months.

However, this random timing has been over-interpreted by many parties, consistent with the “Nothing occurs by Accident” criteria. For example, one commenter argues that “LOG12 was fundemenatlly [sic] flawed from the start, and throughout. It offered no valuable insight or understanding as a result. It is clear to any rational outside observer it had one purpose - to be used to promote the authors advocacy of catastrophic anthropogenic global warming - and to demean and denigrate those who do not believe as he does. The fact this paper has never been published, as Lewandowsky's repeatedly claims, confirms this finding.” It will be interesting to see whether this commenter resists the “Something Must Be Wrong” urge when LOG12 is published or continue to assert that the research is “a fraud”.

Conclusion

Hindsight is always 20:20 but perhaps we should have anticipated the response to LOG12. The results of LOG12 implied that conspiratorial thinking is linked to climate denial, and hence might emerge in turn to defend climate denial against cognitive analysis – and that’s what happened, as we document in Recursive Fury.

Note: this post was cross-posted on Skeptical Science.

Don't trust your Stone Age brain: it's unsustainable

Wed, 20 Mar 2013 09:00:00 EST

Cognitive dissonance is that uncomfortable feeling we have when we know we should invest in solar panels but the 46″ wide screen TV wins out; we know we should catch the bus but we take the car anyway. It’s that sense of discord that arises when emotion and reason don’t get along. And unfortunately, it’s alive and well, sabotaging the climate change debate.

We’ve evolved to feel a single sense of self, but our minds consist of multiple voices. Our emotional brain has first go at making sense of our world, instantly telling us how to behave and what to believe, based on instincts reinforced by upbringing. Sometimes our rational brain is then called upon to endorse our intuitions, which then become beliefs. Problems that are unusually difficult or surprising will recruit our rational brain, but reasoning takes effort and we avoid it when we can.

Unfortunately our emotional brain is encouraging us to pursue perceived self-interest even if that means trashing the planet. This leaves our rational brain to try to justify our actions, even while the walls come tumbling down and the temperatures keep rising.

If we are to have any chance of a future we need to understand why our intuitions are so poor, and how we might temper them by engaging our ability to reason.

We haven’t evolved to be successful in the modern world. Civilisation arose only 12,000 years ago; in evolutionary terms that’s just the blink of an eye. Ninety-nine per cent of human evolution occurred during the Stone Age, so our evolved instincts, personality traits, and even some of our cognitive “short-cuts” are much better suited to this Pleistocene world.

Evolution didn’t care about the future; it was simply driven by those who survived and left the most descendants. So our ancestors were the ones who were best at competing for food and status, securing mates and having babies. They were materialistic, living very much in the present and rarely constrained by sustainability. They ate a broad range of foods, and if resources became depleted they could expand their territories or move on, behaviour that led to the extinction of many animals and to extensive migration.

A level of altruism did evolve, but it was circumscribed by benefits to kin, expectations of reciprocal reward, and an obsession with fairness. Altruism can often therefore be trumped by self-interest.

We might expect that intelligence and language would have been game-changers; they were, but not necessarily for the better. We learnt to tame nature and harvest its bounty, to build great cities, and to harness the laws of physics and chemistry. We may celebrate the Industrial Revolution as the beginning of modern civilisation, but it also ushered in burgeoning overpopulation, resource exploitation, pollution and climate change.

So if we evolved to exploit nature, and to be blind to the consequences, what now? Our only chance is to wrest control away from our emotional brain, and construct a new reality where our rational brain can take control.

We need to design a new kind of democracy where many government decisions are made cooperatively, with multi-party representation and the input of experts. Such think tanks must have strategies in place to promote critical self-analysis and to “frame” policy to reflect the long-term reality. The cost of climate change mitigation can then be shown to be minute compared to the cost of inaction.

If we value a sustainable world, the GDP must be replaced by a measure of a country’s wealth, including resources, social capital and the cost of pollution. Costs should reflect the inclusive cradle-to-grave value of products and services, so that choices reflect out true long-term interests. Conspicuous consumption might be curbed further by offering workers the choice of more leisure rather than a salary increase, and by rewarding excellence with honours and privileges, rather than fat pay packets and obscene bonuses.

Education must produce adults who can think critically and understand what’s at stake and why our judgement is flawed. To counter self-interest, the government should use incentives and disincentives to guide public behaviour. We need to encourage altruism by instituting reciprocal, incremental improvements, and by showing leadership.

We are at the crossroads. Unless we recognise the less-adaptive aspects of human nature and devise ways of keeping them in check, the world we bequeath to our children will be a diminished one. We have the means to do this, but do we have the will? Evolution may have made us the most intelligent animal on Earth, but it makes no promise that we will be survivors.

This article was originally published at The Conversation. Read the original article.

Caps Review Part 7: Complementary measures

Mon, 18 Mar 2013 11:40:00 EST

This is the sixth part in a series about the Caps and Targets Review being conducted by the Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) this year. Part 1 summarized the global climate crisis, Part 2 explained the importance of the review and how CCA should approach it, Part 3 outlined the role Australia should play in climate action, Part 4 debunked the economic justifications for inaction, Part 5 makes my central recommendations on emissions caps, and Part 6 makes recommendations on the design of the carbon price mechanism. This part argues for and suggests some complementary measures.

The carbon price should not be expected to do all the work. A single measure is highly vulnerable to repeal, failure, low ambition, or erosion over time, and there are many ways in which emissions trading schemes can go wrong. We need a range of climate policies operating alongside each other, so success in cutting emissions does not depend on the survival and effectiveness of any single policy.

Complementary policies are not redundant: they are a way of ensuring emissions cuts occur where it is most important instead of merely where it is cheapest (and ensuring they occur domestically, if international offsets continue to be allowed). Also, some of the required structural economic changes (eg. infrastructure) may not be driven by a price signal alone.

The carbon price should not be used as an excuse to scrap other existing climate policies or preclude new ones, and the Government should consider reinstating policies it has already scrapped. The COAG Taskforce on Regulatory and Competition Reform, due to conclude its work this month, must not cut any climate policies.

CCA should recommend the government continue to introduce new measures to assist in meeting emissions targets. Some complementary measures already exist (including the RET, CEFC, and ARENA), but they are far from sufficient in scale.

Currently annual carbon price revenue ($8 billion[i], which could fall dramatically after the shift to emissions trading[ii]) and annual renewable energy subsidies (approximately $300 million rising to $2 billion next year) are outweighed by the incentive-to-pollute provided by annual fossil fuel subsidies ($13 billion including $4 billion in free carbon permits[iii], the justifications for which are unconvincing). The net effect is to make polluting industries more profitable. These fossil fuel subsidies should be removed.

There is a risk[iv] (albeit diminishing due to the falling prices of renewables) that a too-low carbon price, instead of deploying renewables as is urgently needed, could drive investment in gas-fired electricity generation, locking in fossil fuel infrastructure with a lifetime of decades.[v] CCA should recommend the government ban new fossil-fuelled electricity generators to guard against this risk.

More government funding is needed to support deployment of existing zero-carbon technologies and zero-carbon infrastructure. Though R&D is also important, the emphasis should be on deployment as there is no time to wait for new technologies to be invented. The government should not prioritize funding for carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology, which cannot be relied upon to save the fossil fuel industry because it is unlikely to be deployed on a global scale for decades.[vi] (Having said that, some form of CCS technology may be needed later to directly remove CO₂ from the atmosphere.)

New wind power is now cheaper per megawatt-hour than new coal- or gas-fired electricity generation, but renewable energy still needs subsidies to compete with existing generators.[vii] Renewable energy subsidies are justified, especially considering the fossil fuel industry is profitable today thanks to enormous past and present subsidies and other supportive policies. New renewable energy subsidies could be funded by cutting fossil fuel subsidies, cutting carbon price compensation, and/or abandoning the unnecessary goal of a budget surplus. The biggest threat facing humanity is worth spending money on.

The RET should be increased to reach 100% as soon as possible. Funding for CEFC should be increased, and should be solely directed to zero-carbon technologies. A federal feed-in tariff should be introduced for each renewable energy technology. Most of the EU’s renewable energy has been delivered by feed-in tariffs.[viii]

The hole left by the failure of contracts-for-closure should be replaced with a new policy to close coal-fired power plants and replace them with renewable energy.

A greenhouse trigger should be added to the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, and the federal government’s approval powers under the Act should not be delegated to the states.

Climate change mitigation should be one of the National Electricity Market objectives.

Mandatory energy efficiency and fuel efficiency standards should be introduced.

Most importantly, the Energy White Paper must be replaced with a new energy policy that will phase out fossil fuels, not one based on the delusion that we can afford to burn it all. Australia should declare a moratorium on new fossil fuel mining and export projects, and begin phasing out existing ones. Australia could then launch international negotiations on a global fossil fuel phaseout.

Conclusion

In this series, we’ve learned the climate crisis threatens human civilization; it is far more urgent than is widely appreciated; and solving it requires phasing out fossil fuels. We learned the Caps and Targets Review is pivotal, must consider matters beyond its scope, and must make ambitious recommendations to send a strong investment signal and counter the sabotaging influence of the fossil fuel industry. We learned unconditional unilateral ambition is required to break the international deadlock; Australia has greater responsibility for climate change than it acknowledges; and Australia should move beyond its inadequate existing targets and lead the world. We learned the economic justifications for inaction are greatly exaggerated, short-termist, and confuse fossil fuel interests with the public interest.

We learned Australia must set emissions caps that rapidly reduce toward zero to decarbonize the economy as fast as possible, enforced in a way that does not limit ambition. We learned Australia’s ETS needs fixing to ensure the emissions caps are effective; international offsets must be disallowed; and there is a case for greater restrictions on the domestic carbon market to ensure emissions cuts occur where they are most important instead of where they are cheapest. Finally, we learned Australia must support its carbon price with other new and existing policies to address domestic emissions, and start phasing out its fossil fuel exports.

Australian governments to date have acted as if our future depends on protecting the fossil fuel industry from climate policy. We must persuade the government of the reality: that our future depends on protecting our climate from the fossil fuel industry. Therefore I urge all Australians who are concerned about climate change to communicate these messages to the Caps and Targets Review.

This series was first posted on
Precarious Climate

[i] ‘Carbon price tug of war’, Australia Institute, viewed 21 February 2013, https://www.tai.org.au/node/586

[ii] G Winestock & M Priest, ‘EU carbon price a hard act to follow’, Australian Financial Review, 18 February 2013, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.afr.com/p/national/eu_carbon_price_hard_act_to_follow_Lt5XbJv3iE9iyKRMit5tUI

[iii] ‘Carbon price tug of war’, Australia Institute, viewed 21 February 2013, https://www.tai.org.au/node/586

[iv] P Hearps, ‘A carbon price won’t bring zero emissions’, The Conversation, 30 March 2011, viewed 21 February 2013, http://theconversation.edu.au/a-carbon-price-wont-bring-zero-emissions-23

[v] J Romm, ‘International Energy Agency Finds “Safe” Gas Fracking Would Destroy A Livable Climate’, Climate Progress, weblog, 30 May 2012, viewed 14 September 2012, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/05/30/491970/international-energy-agency-finds-safe-gas-fracking-would-destroy-a-livable-climate/

[vi] M Atkin, ‘Clean coal “unviable for two decades”’, ABC News, 17 February 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-02-15/clean-coal-unviable-advisor-says/3828946

[vii] G Parkinson, ‘Renewables now cheaper than coal and gas in Australia’, Renew Economy, 7 February 2013, viewed 21 February 2013, http://reneweconomy.com.au/2013/renewables-now-cheaper-than-coal-and-gas-in-australia-62268

[viii] F Green & R Finighan, Laggard to Leader: How Australia can lead the world to zero carbon prosperity, Beyond Zero Emissions, 2012, viewed 9 September 2012, http://media.beyondzeroemissions.org/Laggard_Leaderv1.pdf, p. 60.

Caps Review Part 6: ETS design flaws and pitfalls

Fri, 15 Mar 2013 08:40:00 EST

This is the sixth part in a series about the Caps and Targets Review being conducted by the Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) this year. Part 1 summarized the global climate crisis, Part 2 explained the importance of the review and how CCA should approach it, Part 3 outlined the role Australia should play in climate action, Part 4 debunked the economic justifications for inaction, and Part 5 makes my central recommendations on emissions caps. This part makes recommendations on the design of the carbon price mechanism.

The collapse of overseas carbon markets is a clear warning of the pitfalls of emissions trading schemes.[1] Given the Australian government has chosen to proceed with a carbon price that will become an ETS, it is essential that the Australian ETS does not fail like the EU ETS, NZ ETS, or Kyoto offset mechanisms.

Treasury projections show present Australian climate policies will not drive a phaseout of fossil-fuelled electricity generation in Australia, nor even an absolute reduction in domestic emissions, for many decades. Domestic emissions would actually rise until the 2030s then fall back to today’s level by 2050, and fossil fuels would still provide 60% of Australia’s electricity in 2035.[2] These outcomes are completely unacceptable.

International emissions trading

Australia’s present plans and agreements for international linking and offsets raise huge concerns:

It is difficult to determine whether international offsets represent real emissions cuts (eg. currently the most common type of Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) comes from Asian companies who produce gratuitous pollution so they can be paid to stop[3]). This criticism is based not on an irrational distrust of foreigners, but on a realistic skepticism about the difficulties of carbon accounting in developing countries with no absolute emissions caps, less regulation, and in some cases a less accountable government. (Linking to a scheme with an absolute emissions cap like the EU ETS is comparatively credible but still has the other problems outlined below.)
International linking and offsets hinder domestic decarbonization at a time when all countries need to decarbonize as quickly as possible.
International linking allows distinct emissions trading schemes to contaminate each other with their flaws (eg. the EU ETS has already achieved its 2020 emissions target eight years ahead of schedule[4], thus no longer provides any incentive to cut emissions, and so far Poland has vetoed all attempts to fix the scheme[5]). Difficulties may also arise from linking schemes with different accounting rules.
Australia’s carbon price would be largely determined by policy decisions made in other countries. Australia would likely be flooded by cheap international permits, causing the Australian carbon price to crash like its international counterparts. This is especially a concern considering the present rock-bottom carbon prices in the EU ETS and other international carbon markets. According to CCA modeling cited by the Australian Financial Review, the Australian carbon price could fall to $10/tonne in 2015.[6]
International offsets are unfair because they shift the burden of cutting emissions from Australia to other countries which are often poorer and less carbon-intensive. Although it is important for Australia to finance climate action in other countries, it should be supplementary to domestic action, not as an offset for domestic emissions.
The Australian public and other countries expect Australia to cut its own emissions.

The 50% “limit” on international offsets is meaningless because it allows companies to pollute up to twice the level of the Australian emissions cap.[7] Even the more recently added 12.5% limit on CERs (a step in the right direction) still allows companies to emit in excess of the cap by a very significant amount. It is unclear whether there will be any limit on importation of European permits.

South Korea and California will allow zero international permits in their emissions trading schemes.[8] Australia should do the same. The Australian government should not proceed with its intention to link to the EU ETS, Kyoto offset mechanisms, or any other international emissions trading scheme or offset mechanism.

Domestic emissions trading

There are also reasons for concern about the effectiveness of domestic emissions trading (particularly the intention to allow unlimited offsets from the domestic Carbon Farming Initiative).

Not all tonnes of CO₂e are equivalent. A given amount of CO₂e abated today in one way (eg. closing a coal mine) and the same amount of CO₂e abated today in another way (eg. preserving a forest), although they may look the same on paper in the short term, may not be equally important in the long term. This is because different types and sources of greenhouse gases result from different economic processes and play different roles in the climate system. Although all emissions are important, it is of particular importance and urgency to phase out fossil fuel CO₂ emissions because they are the largest and longest-lived cause of anthropogenic global warming (as opposed to land carbon or other greenhouse gases). If the world fails to phase out fossil fuels in a reasonable timeframe, all other efforts to mitigate climate change will matter little.

Policymakers must understand the basic facts of the carbon cycle. On human timescales carbon easily moves between the atmosphere, ocean, and land. It is only over geological timescales that these “surface reservoirs” exchange carbon with deeper, larger reservoirs. The most important thing humans are doing is mining and burning fossil carbon that has been buried for millions of years, thus emitting carbon at a pace many orders of magnitude greater than the rate of the processes which remove carbon from surface reservoirs. While storing more carbon in the land is a necessary part of climate action, it is far from sufficient and not nearly as urgent as eliminating fossil fuel emissions. Even if forest cover was returned to preindustrial levels, the carbon cycle would still be overwhelmed by fossil fuel emissions. A proportion of the fossil carbon will stay aboveground for millennia, and the land is a climate feedback so cannot store carbon permanently. Finally, from a practical perspective, land carbon is harder to measure.

Short-lived climate pollutants like methane, soot, ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons are more powerful at trapping heat than CO₂ but do not linger in the atmosphere for as long. While it is very important to cut emissions of short-lived climate pollutants to prevent rapid near-term warming, this also should not be considered a substitute for phasing out fossil fuel CO₂ emissions to limit long-term warming.

Other factors affecting the relative significance of different types of abatement which may not be accounted for by the carbon market (or by cost-benefit analysis) include: whether it locks in or prevents lock-in of fossil fuel infrastructure, whether it changes relative technology prices, whether the emissions reductions are permanent, and whether the emissions reductions will continue beyond the start year; in broad terms, its long-term contribution to systemic decarbonization of the economy.

The Productivity Commission, which is often referred to on whether climate policies are cost-effective, is not a credible source. It has published an inaccurate estimate of the cost of emissions cuts from solar PV[9], which it continues to cite[10] despite it having quietly debunked by the Productivity Commission itself.[11] Neither analysis accounted for technology price reductions.

An ETS is supposed to ensure emissions cuts occur where it is cheapest, but I am concerned the carbon market is unlikely to deem the most important places to cut emissions as the cheapest. If it does not, it will instead prevent the most urgently needed transition, away from fossil fuels (in which case it would merely limit the cost for the fossil fuel industry). This is especially a concern considering the free permits handed out to large polluters, which in at least some cases are making them more profitable.[12] [13] [14]

An alternative approach might be to compartmentalize the ETS by sector and/or greenhouse gas to ensure action on all fronts. Instead of a single catch-all commodity called “carbon” that equates many different things, there could be several commodities (eg. “fossil carbon”, “land carbon”, “chlorofluorocarbon”, etc), each with its own separate emissions caps and market. Companies would be allowed to exchange apples for apples, but not apples for oranges. Greatest priority (strongest cap, highest floor price) would be given to cutting the commodity with the most important role in climate change: fossil carbon. This compartmentalized emissions trading would allow each type of emissions to be reduced at the lowest credible cost.

Miscellaneous issues

Australia has delayed application of the latest science on the relative heat-trapping potential of greenhouse gases until 2017-18.[xv] It should be applied immediately so that present policy is based on the best available information.

Present measurement and accounting of fugitive emissions of methane from unconventional gas extraction is inadequate. Full measurement and accounting of these emissions should be mandated. There is evidence to suggest gas-fired electricity generation may actually be worse than coal-fired generation on a 20-year timescale when fugitive emissions are taken into account.[xvi]

The floor price should be reinstated (preferably at a higher level than the original $15/tonne) to help prevent the carbon price from crashing. The ceiling price should be removed because it limits the penalty for pollution.

Current rules allow liable companies to bank present carbon permits to use in the future, and borrow future permits to use in the present. This is unwise as it creates uncertainty in Australia’s emissions trajectory, and could result in a surplus of permits.

Emissions are counted on a facility-by-facility basis rather than company-by-company. I am concerned companies could avoid paying the carbon price by setting up a large number of small facilities each with small emissions.

It is often argued climate policy requires a choice between market mechanisms and regulatory ones, but that is a false dichotomy. A mix of markets and regulations are needed; indeed the carbon price already has both market-based and regulatory aspects. I am advocating a greater regulatory aspect to ensure the market aspect delivers an effective outcome. It would be unwise to leave too many greenhouse gas decisions to markets, because a market failure is driving the problem in the first place. On that basis, a climate policy is more likely to be effective the more limited its market aspects and the more restrictive its regulatory aspects. If markets are badly designed by governments then they will make the wrong investment decisions.

In the final part, I will argue for and suggest some complementary measures.

[1] ‘U.N. offsets crash to 15 cents ahead of EU ban vote’, Point Carbon, 12 December 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.2098417

[2] Commonwealth of Australia, Strong Growth, Low Pollution: Modelling a carbon price, 2011, viewed 12 November 2012, http://archive.treasury.gov.au/carbonpricemodelling/content/report/downloads/Modelling_Report_Consolidated_update.pdf, Charts 5.2, 5.19.

[3] E Rosenthal & AW Lehren, ‘Profits on carbon credits drive output of a harmful gas’, New York Times, 9 August 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/world/asia/incentive-to-slow-climate-change-drives-output-of-harmful-gases.html

[4] F Harvey, ‘Doha climate talks: EU weakened over new emissions targets’, Guardian, 23 November 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/nov/23/doha-climate-talks-eu-weakened-emissions

[5] G Parkinson, ‘The triumph of Tony Abbott’s carbon alter-ego’, Renew Economy, 29 August 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://reneweconomy.com.au/2012/the-triumph-of-tony-abbotts-carbon-alter-ego-92270

[6] G Winestock & M Priest, ‘EU carbon price a hard act to follow’, Australian Financial Review, 18 February 2013, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.afr.com/p/national/eu_carbon_price_hard_act_to_follow_Lt5XbJv3iE9iyKRMit5tUI

[7] T Edis, ‘How Labor can improve the carbon pricing scheme’, Climate Spectator, 13 August 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.climatespectator.com.au/commentary/how-labor-can-improve-carbon-pricing-scheme

[8] A Morton, ‘Australia lags on carbon tax rules’, Age, 26 July 2012, viewed 21 November 2013, http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-news/australia-lags-on-carbon-tax-rules-20120725-22qz9.html

[9] Productivity Commission, Carbon Emission Policies in Key Economies, Research Report, 2011, viewed 14 September 2012, http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/109830/carbon-prices.pdf

[10] G Parkinson, ‘Why you are paying $10/hr to run your neighbour’s air-con’, Renew Economy, 18 October 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://reneweconomy.com.au/2012/why-you-are-paying-10hr-to-run-your-neighbours-air-con-21376

[11] Productivity Commission, Carbon Emission Policies in Key Economies: Responses to Feedback on Certain Estimates for Australia, Supplement to Research Report, 2011, viewed 14 September 2012, http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/114244/carbon-prices-supplement.pdf

[12] S Cullen, ‘Coal-fired stations “$1b better off under carbon tax”’, ABC News, 6 September 2012, viewed 21 November 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-06/coal-fired-stations-1b-better-off-under-carbon-tax/4246100

[13] S Lauder & S Lane, ‘Consumers “paying twice” as carbon emitters compensated’, ABC News, 20 February 2013, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-02-20/consumers-paying-twice-as-carbon-emitters-compensated/4529268

[14] T Edis, ‘How polluters can cream the carbon scheme’, Climate Spectator, 5 September 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.climatespectator.com.au/commentary/how-polluters-can-cream-carbon-scheme

[xv] G Combet, Australia ready to join Kyoto second commitment period, Australian Government Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 9 November 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/Files/minister/combet/2012/media/November/Combet-MediaRelease-302-12.pdf

[xvi] RW Howarth, Santoro, R & Ingraffea, A, ‘Methane and the greenhouse-gas footprint of natural gas from shale formations’, Climate Change, 2011, viewed 14 September 2012, http://www.eeb.cornell.edu/howarth/Howarth et al 2011.pdf

Caps Review Part 5: Emissions caps

Thu, 14 Mar 2013 16:00:00 EST

This is the fifth part in a series about the Caps and Targets Review being conducted by the Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) this year. Part 1 summarized the global climate crisis, Part 2 explained the importance of the review and how CCA should approach it, Part 3 outlined the role Australia should play in climate action, and Part 4 debunked the economic justifications for inaction. This part makes my central recommendations on emissions caps.

Emissions caps are intended to cut emissions as fast as possible, not to limit the pace of emissions cuts or guarantee property rights to go on polluting. They should be designed in such a way that they do not inadvertently limit the pace of emissions cuts, which would conflict with the intent of the policy. Beginning the systemic change in the economy necessary to move toward zero emissions is more important than meeting an arbitrary emissions target and timetable.

The carbon price is intended as a mandatory penalty for carbon pollution and an incentive to drive investment in zero-carbon technology and energy efficiency. It is not intended to drive investment in less carbon-intensive fossil fuels. A higher carbon price is better than a lower one, because the bigger the shock to the system, the more likely it is to drive behavior change. A weak emissions cap, or weak policy design, would cause the carbon price to crash to levels like present international carbon prices, undermining the incentive to invest in zero-carbon assets.

The Government’s present target of a 5% emissions reduction below 2000 by 2020 is meaninglessly weak given the urgency of rapid global emissions cuts. The 2050 target of an 80% emissions reduction below 2000 has far too long a timeframe: the 2010s is the critical decade for avoiding dangerous climate change.

Ross Garnaut’s method of allocating emissions targets[i] (on which the government has based its approach) effectively rewards Australia for having high per-capita emissions, rapid projected population growth, and rapid projected business-as-usual emissions growth (factors which if anything justify a more stringent target for Australia than for other countries); and limits Australia’s maximum ambition for no good reason. Garnaut further recommended the calculated target of 25% below 2000 by 2020 be conditional on a global agreement unlikely to materialize, which is unreasonable for the reasons explained in Part 3. Furthermore, Garnaut’s advocacy of international emissions trading makes a mockery of dividing the work into “fair shares”.

In contrast, CCA’s mandate puts no limit on the ambition of the targets it can recommend. It should recommend an emissions reduction trajectory fast enough to shift the political focus from meeting an inadequate 2020 target to slashing emissions in a single electoral term, to accelerate the pace of change and so the incumbent government can be held accountable for its targets. The emissions cap should decrease each year, and reach zero as soon as possible.

To be consistent with an emergency response to preserve a safe climate, and to be fair on developing countries, Australia would need to cut its emissions faster than the 6%/year global rate mentioned in Part 1.

CCA should recommend a rate of emissions reductions faster than, and certainly no slower than, the observed emissions reduction rate during the fixed price period (which will be assessed by a contemporaneous CCA review). It should also be faster than the projected emissions reduction rate in a scenario where the fixed carbon price continues and is complemented by other climate policies like the Renewable Energy Target (RET) and Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC). It should cause the carbon price to rise rapidly over time (ie. much faster than a few percent per year) to strengthen the signal to investors.

Yet another reason for ambitious targets is that the rapidly falling prices of renewable energy technologies make it much easier to cut emissions than was believed when the 5% target was set in 2008.

The targets recommended by the Review, if approved by Parliament, will lock in an emissions trajectory through to 2020. CCA must not make the mistake of recommending unambitious emissions caps, as such a mistake would be difficult, if not impossible, to correct for five or more years. Also, CCA should recommend amending the Clean Energy Act to clarify that carbon permits are not associated with property rights so that emissions caps can be tightened after they have been set.

To encourage voluntary actions, there must be a clear mechanism to tighten the emissions cap to account for verifiable voluntary emissions cuts, including emissions cuts from other federal, state, and local policies (ie. making those policies additional to the ETS). To prevent inertia, verified emissions cuts should be subtracted from the cap in the following year, not five years after they occur. Also, recalled permits should be cancelled instead of being reissued. Any possibility of overachieving or oversupply of permits should be welcomed as an opportunity to tighten the next year’s emissions cap.

In Part 6, I will make recommendations on the design of the carbon price mechanism.

[i] R Garnaut, The Garnaut climate change review, Cambridge University Press, 2008, viewed 22 February 2013, http://www.garnautreview.org.au/CA25734E0016A131/WebObj/GarnautClimateChangeReview-FinalReport-30September2008(Fullversion)/$File/Garnaut Climate Change Review - Final Report – 30 September 2008 (Full version).pdf, pp. 205-213, 278-285.

Caps Review Part 4: Economics

Wed, 13 Mar 2013 14:00:00 EST

This is the fourth part in a series about the Caps and Targets Review being conducted by the Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) this year. Part 1 summarized the global climate crisis, Part 2 explained the importance of the review and how CCA should approach it, and Part 3 outlined the role Australia should play in climate action. This part debunks the economic justifications for inaction.

The Australian government should not limit itself to least-cost mechanisms. Maximizing the scale, pace, and effectiveness of climate action is far more important than limiting the costs of action. Effective climate policies that help avoid enormous costs from climate change are preferable to climate policies that are cheap and ineffective.

The apparent costs of climate policies are short-term and greatly exaggerated while the external costs of CO₂ emissions are greatly underestimated and long-lived. Most of the costs of climate change are long-term, unquantifiable, worst-case, and non-market costs, which are not included in cost-benefit analyses of climate action like that of the Garnaut Review.[i] Also, many cost-benefit analyses use high discount rates to estimate the future costs of climate change, which is questionable both on ethical grounds and because it assumes economic growth can continue indefinitely. The true external cost of CO₂ emissions could be far higher than the current carbon price of $23/tonne, so high that practically any measures to move to a zero-carbon economy are worth taking.[ii]

Whenever someone tells you a policy is or isn’t cost-effective, ask “cost-effective based on which assumptions, over what time period, and for whom?” Emissions cuts that appear cheap can often be less credible than those with a higher upfront cost (I will elaborate on this point in Part 6). Contribution to the long-term structural change required to decarbonize the economy should be prioritized over apparent short-term cost-effectiveness. Arguments for economic efficiency are often used as excuses to undermine the intent of climate policies. Such efforts to minimize costs overlook that the cost of climate policies is (or at least is supposed to be) mainly paid by polluting companies: it’s like saying anti-tobacco legislation should be “least-cost” for tobacco companies.

Australian governments to date have tended to equate fossil fuel mining and export interests with the national interest. This misguided belief can be traced to a major mistake made in the 1980s in energy and trade policy, to stake Australia’s competitiveness on coal exports.[iii] Given the scale of the climate change threat, climate policy must not be subordinated to this mistaken goal.

The contribution of fossil fuels to the economy is overblown. Only 0.3% of Australian jobs are in coal mining. The majority of mining industry profits either go overseas or benefit only a small minority of Australians. The mining boom is driving up the Australian dollar and thereby destroying other industries. The mining sector did not prevent a recession, but in fact went into recession itself in 2009.[iv] In one sense, having high per capita emissions makes it easier for Australia to cut emissions than other countries, because there is more “low-hanging fruit”.[v] Even phasing out Australia’s coal exports would merely cause Australian GDP to double by 2031 instead of by 2030[vi], paling in comparison to the impacts of the several degrees of global warming associated with continuing demand for those exports.

Continuing to rely on fossil fuels would damage Australia’s future competitiveness. The fact that most fossil fuels are unburnable implies the global economy contains a “carbon bubble”. The valuation of fossil fuel companies is based on the assumption that their reserves will be burned. If we wish to avoid global catastrophe, that bubble must burst. When it does, more than $20 trillion worth of fossil fuel reserves will become stranded assets and the companies’ value will plummet.[vii] Environmentally unsustainable investments are ultimately also economically unsustainable. Those countries least reliant on fossil fuels will be most competitive in the future.

Australia can exit the fossil fuel business and instead export renewable energy technologies to the world. The relative importance of sectors in the Australian economy has always changed over time. Australia has vast renewable energy resources. It is possible for Australia to achieve 100% renewable energy by scaling up existing technologies.[viii] The price of renewables are falling exponentially as they are deployed, and can be further reduced by scaling up deployment, whereas the price of fossil fuels will ultimately rise as more and more countries price carbon and because they are non-renewable resources. Australian action can help change the relative prices of energy technologies globally.[ix]

The main contributor to electricity price rises has been gold-plated investment in transmission and distribution, not carbon pricing or other climate policies.[x] In contrast, climate change can be expected to cause massive increases to the cost of living, particularly food prices.

Domestic equity concerns should be addressed by assisting workers to transition into green jobs, not by handing out free permits to polluting companies. International equity concerns should be addressed by providing developing countries with funding and technology for climate change mitigation and adaptation, not by continuing to supply them with fossil fuels whose effects will hurt the world’s poorest worst of all. In many off-grid regions, solar PV is cheaper than fossil fuels.[xi]

The most important equity issue that CCA must consider is intergenerational. Young people like myself and future generations will suffer the impacts of the greenhouse gases emitted in the present. In this context, cost-benefit analyses tend to be inequitable because the use of discount rates effectively discounts the lives and living standards of future generations.[xii]

In Part 5, I will make my central recommendations on emissions caps.

[ii] F Ackerman & Stanton, E, Climate Risks and Carbon Prices: Revising the Social Cost of Carbon, Economics for Equity and Environment, 2011, viewed 14 September 2012, http://www.e3network.org/papers/Climate_Risks_and_Carbon_Prices_executive-summary_full-report_comments.pdf

[iii] G Pearse, ‘Quarry Vision: Coal, climate change, and the end of the resources boom’, Quarterly Essay 33, Schwartz Media Pty Ltd, 2009, pp. 25-26, 43.

[iv] F Green & R Finighan, Laggard to Leader: How Australia can lead the world to zero carbon prosperity, Beyond Zero Emissions, 2012, viewed 9 September 2012, http://media.beyondzeroemissions.org/Laggard_Leaderv1.pdf, pp. 82-84.

[v] C Hamilton, Scorcher: The dirty politics of climate change, 2007, Black Inc. Agenda, Melbourne, pp. 42-43.

[vi] G Pearse, ‘Quarry Vision: Coal, climate change, and the end of the resources boom’, Quarterly Essay 33, Schwartz Media Pty Ltd, 2009, pp. 87.

[vii] Carbon Tracker Initiative, Unburnable Carbon: Are the world’s financial markets carrying a carbon bubble?, 2011, viewed 9 September 2012, http://www.carbontracker.org/linkfileshare/Unburnable-Carbon-Full1.pdf

[viii] Beyond Zero Emissions, Zero Carbon Australia Stationary Energy Plan, 2010, viewed 9 September 2012, http://media.beyondzeroemissions.org/ZCA2020_Stationary_Energy_Report_v1.pdf

[ix] F Green & R Finighan, Laggard to Leader: How Australia can lead the world to zero carbon prosperity, Beyond Zero Emissions, 2012, viewed 9 September 2012, http://media.beyondzeroemissions.org/Laggard_Leaderv1.pdf, pp. 55-56, 80-81.

[x] J Grimes, ‘The truth about rising power prices’, Renew Economy, 20 June 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://reneweconomy.com.au/2012/the-truth-about-rising-power-prices-75112

[xi] F Green & R Finighan, Laggard to Leader: How Australia can lead the world to zero carbon prosperity, Beyond Zero Emissions, 2012, viewed 9 September 2012, http://media.beyondzeroemissions.org/Laggard_Leaderv1.pdf, p. 47.

[xii] D Roberts, ‘Discount rates: A boring thing you should know about (with otters!)’, Grist (blog), 24 September 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://grist.org/article/discount-rates-a-boring-thing-you-should-know-about-with-otters/

Caps Review Part 3: Australia’s role

Tue, 12 Mar 2013 13:14:00 EST

This is the third part in a series about the Caps and Targets Review being conducted by the Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) this year. Part 1 summarized the global climate crisis, and Part 2 explained the importance of the review and how CCA should approach it. This part outlines the role Australia should play in climate action.

Australia should take an activist, not avoidant approach to climate change mitigation.

Ross Garnaut’s paradigm on Australia’s role in mitigating climate change, on which the Government has based its approach, is deeply flawed. A more realistic approach has been outlined in the Laggard to Leader report by Beyond Zero Emissions.[i] Australia should not limit itself to implementing its inadequate existing targets. In the absence of global climate action on the necessary scale, there is a need for ambitious unilateral leadership. Unilateral action is required to get a momentum for global action. All willing countries should aim to use every lever at their disposal to cut emissions within their sphere of influence to zero or near-zero in as short a timeframe as possible, much sooner than 2050. Australia can play an important role in this regard.

Ambitious action by Australia should not be conditional on international action. The UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”[ii] means Australia, as a developed country and high per-capita emitter, has the obligation and capacity to lead. Developing countries expect Australia to take unconditional ambitious action, and Australia’s lagging on climate change has damaged its international reputation.[iii] Also, conditional targets tend to be forgotten, particularly when the conditions are as unreasonable as they are at present.

Contrary to what some argue, Australia is not already leading the world with its $23/tonne carbon price. One reason for the low carbon price in the EU ETS is that many European countries have other climate policies (carbon floor prices, feed-in tariffs to support renewables, energy efficiency policies, transport policies, etc) which are taking the load off the ETS. Another reason is the EU ETS is badly designed (eg. its 2020 target requires no emissions cuts from present levels[iv]), which is no reason for Australia to follow their example. Regardless, no country on Earth is presently doing enough.

The position taken by the Australian government in UNFCCC negotiations has been largely counterproductive, including: its membership of the Umbrella Group of delayer countries; its prioritization of a post-2020 agreement over raising ambition as is urgently required; its insistence on a meaninglessly weak Kyoto Protocol second commitment period target for Australia; its unreasonable conditions for Australia to increase its Kyoto target; its refusal to countenance even conditional targets deeper than 25% below 2000; its pursuit of creative accounting rules for LULUCF (land use, land use change, and forestry) in both Kyoto commitment periods[v]; its intended reliance on international offset mechanisms; and its failure to provide finance for developing countries.

Instead, Australia should play a leading role in the UNFCCC. It should adopt an unconditional ambitious Kyoto target and stop advocating loopholes. Australia should acknowledge the “Australia clause” was an error committed by a previous government, propose an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to correct it, and stop using it in its national emissions accounting. Australia should lobby other countries to raise their ambition. Australia should consider the promised post-2020 agreement as a distant last priority unless the implementation date is brought forward, because it is extremely misguided to focus on the mirage of a possible future agreement to be implemented after the critical decade is over. Australia is also obligated to provide funding for climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.

Australia’s domestic greenhouse gas emissions are the 15^th largest in the world and the highest per capita in the OECD. Its cumulative historical emissions are the 14^th highest in the world.[vi] Domestic emissions excluding LULUCF have risen 30% since 1990[vii], further increasing Australia’s obligation. Domestic emissions not covered by the carbon price also need to be addressed, and further increase Australia’s obligation to slash covered emissions.

Domestic emissions are only one part of Australia’s contribution to climate change, which also includes emissions from the burning of fossil fuel exports (which dwarf domestic emissions) and emissions from the manufacture of imported products. In a world where national emissions targets do not add up to a safe global target, Australia shares responsibility for the emissions resulting from its exports and imports.[viii] These other contributions, as well as needing to be addressed themselves, further increase Australia’s obligation to slash domestic emissions.

Present climate policies around the world, including Australia’s, focus on constraining emissions only within their borders. Yet many of the world’s largest proposed fossil fuel projects involve carbon being mined in one country and burned in another.[ix] To target the problem at its source, much more attention must be given to constraining extraction of and global trade in fossil fuels.

Already the majority of Australia’s fossil fuels are exported. Any domestic emissions cuts will be far outweighed by planned exponential growth of fossil fuel exports.

The Australian government’s Energy White Paper[x] plans to facilitate the expansion of fossil fuel mining and export industries at a time when they must be phased out as fast as possible. Not only does the government want Australia’s enormous known fossil fuel reserves to be burned, it even promotes exploration for new ones. It boasts Australia is the world’s largest coal exporter and intends it will soon be the largest exporter of liquid natural gas (LNG). It projects Australia’s coal exports will double and its LNG exports quintuple by 2035 (and the total capacity of proposed coal export ports suggests the reality could be even worse).

Proposed Australian coal export projects collectively have been identified as the second largest proposed expansion of fossil fuel CO₂ emissions after Chinese coal mining.[xi] Demand for these exports depends on a scenario where the world takes no further climate action beyond what has been pledged in UN climate talks, leading to >4°C global warming, despite Australia claiming to support the globally agreed objective of limiting warming to <2°C.[xii]

All the above mean Australia’s present climate policies are completely inadequate.

In Part 4, I will debunk the economic justifications for inaction.

This series was first posted on
Precarious Climate

[i] F Green & R Finighan, Laggard to Leader: How Australia can lead the world to zero carbon prosperity, Beyond Zero Emissions, 2012, viewed 9 September 2012, http://media.beyondzeroemissions.org/Laggard_Leaderv1.pdf.

[ii] United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, viewed 9 September 2012, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf, p. 1.

[iii] C Hamilton, Running From the Storm: The development of climate change policy in Australia, 2001, UNSW Press, Sydney, pp. 89-92.

[iv] F Harvey, ‘Doha climate talks: EU weakened over new emissions targets’, Guardian, 23 November 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/nov/23/doha-climate-talks-eu-weakened-emissions

[v] C Milne, ‘Australia must not rort Kyoto protocol rules’, Australian Greens, 8 December 2011, viewed 22 February 2013, http://greensmps.org.au/content/media-releases/australia-must-not-rort-kyoto-protocol-rules

[vi] F Green & R Finighan, Laggard to Leader: How Australia can lead the world to zero carbon prosperity, Beyond Zero Emissions, 2012, viewed 9 September 2012, http://media.beyondzeroemissions.org/Laggard_Leaderv1.pdf, pp. 17-19.

[vii] Australian Government Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Trend, 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://ageis.climatechange.gov.au/NGGITrend.aspx

[ix] Greenpeace, Point of No Return: The massive climate threats we must avoid, 2013, viewed 23 January 2013, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/climate/2013/PointOfNoReturn.pdf

[x] Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Energy White Paper 2012: Australia’s energy transformation, 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/ewp/2012/Energy_%20White_Paper_2012.pdf

[xi] Greenpeace, Point of No Return: The massive climate threats we must avoid, 2013, viewed 23 January 2013, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/climate/2013/PointOfNoReturn.pdf

[xii] T Edis, ‘Australia’s schizophrenic energy policy’, Climate Spectator, 12 November 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.climatespectator.com.au/commentary/australia-s-schizophrenic-energy-policy

Caps and Targets Review: A 7-part Series (Part I)

Sat, 9 Mar 2013 15:00:00 EST

The Australian Government’s independent Climate Change Authority (CCA) is conducting a Caps and Targets Review this year. In this series I will explain why the review is important, outline what I think its recommendations should be, and attempt to deconstruct everything I believe is wrong with the Government’s climate policies and its underlying flawed beliefs about Australia’s role in climate action.

Anthropogenic global warming is the largest and most urgent threat facing humanity today. There is an extremely urgent need for rapid emissions cuts to mitigate climate change. The extent of climate impacts decades, centuries and millennia from now will be determined by policy decisions taken in the near future. The Government’s own Climate Commission has identified the 2010s as the “Critical Decade” for climate change mitigation.[i]

The latest climate science shows scientists have systematically underestimated the impacts of global warming (possibly because they have overcorrected in response to accusations of alarmism).[ii] The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC AR4) dramatically understates the problem, and AR5 can be expected to do the same because of the conservative nature and inertia of the IPCC process.

There is a high risk that current estimates of climate sensitivity (the degree of global warming associated with a given increase in CO₂) are underestimates, as long-term feedbacks could become significant much sooner than expected.[iii]

The atmospheric CO₂ level is currently approaching 400 ppm[iv] (compared to the preindustrial 280 ppm), which some climatologists argue is already too high to avoid tipping points for dangerous climate change. The safe level has been estimated as somewhere below 350 ppm, which is associated with ~1°C global warming above preindustrial.[v] The Earth has so far warmed by only 0.8°C[vi] (with further warming to come if atmospheric CO₂ remains at or above its present level[vii]), and already the Arctic appears to be crossing a tipping point, implying even 350 ppm is dangerous.

Arctic sea ice is already melting faster in the real world than in the projections that will be included in AR5.[viii] Based on the trend in sea ice volume[ix] and one regional model[x], the Arctic in September could be completely sea-ice-free within a few years. By reversing the surface reflectivity of the northern polar region, the Arctic melt threatens to set off a chain reaction of tipping points, including collapse of the Greenland ice sheet and large-scale release of carbon from melting permafrost.[xi]

The Greenland ice sheet is shrinking at an unprecedented and accelerating rate[xii], and recent modeling suggests the tipping point for total collapse could be a global temperature of around 1.6°C above preindustrial. The lower end of the range of possibilities is only 0.8°C, equal to today’s global temperature.[xiii]

Permafrost is already starting to release carbon and could eventually emit at the same rate as deforestation, a finding which will not be included in AR5.[xiv]

The last time the global temperature was ~1°C above preindustrial (in the Eemian interglacial age 125,000 years ago), the poles were several degrees warmer[xv], there was no summer sea ice in the Arctic[xvi], and sea level was 6-9 meters higher[xvii] [xviii] (meaning at least partial melting of the Greenland and/or West Antarctic ice sheets).

The above findings imply we are already entering a period of dangerous climate change and there is very little time to avoid large feedbacks that could send climate change spiraling out of control.

Because of the long lifetime of CO₂ in the atmosphere, before attempting to reduce its concentration, humanity must first stop emitting.[xix] To return CO₂ to <350 ppm requires cutting global fossil fuel emissions by 6%/year beginning in 2013 (followed by a global reforestation program later this century to start removing CO₂ from the atmosphere). If the world delays until 2020, the required emissions reduction rate would become 15%/year.[xx] At some point the required cuts become so steep they are impossible. In practical terms, everybody needs to cut fossil fuel emissions to zero or near-zero as soon as possible (and eventually less than zero). This means a global phaseout of fossil fuels.

The countries of the world, including Australia, have agreed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to cut emissions fast enough to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”[xxi] and more recently to limit global warming to <2°C.[xxii] As explained above, 2°C is far from a safe target; however, the world is nowhere near on track to achieve even that. A possible global climate agreement has been delayed until at least 2020[xxiii] (and even then it is far from certain to be a globally binding regime[xxiv]). Present voluntary pledges under the UNFCCC, even assuming they are successfully implemented (which is not happening[xxv]), put the Earth on course for an unimaginably catastrophic >4°C global warming by 2100 (plus potentially large feedbacks and post-2100 warming).[xxvi] The “ambition gap” between these pledges and a 2°C pathway is growing instead of shrinking.

There is very little time to shift away from business-as-usual. CO₂ is now rising by ~2 ppm/year[xxvii] and emissions are still accelerating: annual global fossil fuel CO₂ emissions have risen by 58% since 1990 and rose 2.6% in 2012.[xxviii] The vast majority of the Earth’s known fossil fuel reserves must be left in the ground if humanity is to even meet the agreed goal of limiting global warming to <2°C (let alone reduce CO₂ to <350 ppm).[xxix]

Given the mounting evidence that even 1°C of warming is dangerous, it is extremely reckless to be complacent about the world’s present path to >4°C. Human civilization is unlikely to be able to adapt to anything like that level of global warming.[xxx] There is no precedent in human history: global temperature has varied by only a few tenths of a degree in the relatively stable climate of the past 10,000 years in which human civilization developed[xxxi] (though even such small global variation sometimes produced local climate changes large enough to cause or contribute to the demise of local civilizations[xxxii]). When the Earth was 5°C cooler 20,000 years ago, northern Europe and Canada were covered by ice sheets.[xxxiii] It has not been 4°C warmer since Antarctica was ice-free 35 million years ago.[xxxiv]

It is impossible to predict the exact social impacts of climate change, but it is not difficult to imagine unprecedented migrations of hundreds of millions of people, resource wars, and even a collapse of global civilization.

Some argue it is already too late to avert dangerous climate change. Even if that turns out to be correct, we must act now to limit the damage by decarbonizing the global economy as fast as possible. In case it is too late, geoengineering to remove CO₂ from the atmosphere on a large scale and/or cool the planet now also warrants serious consideration, albeit as a last resort.

In Part 2, I will explain the importance of the Caps and Targets Review and how CCA should approach it.

This series was first posted on
Precarious Climate

[i] Climate Commission, The Critical Decade: Climate science, risks and responses, Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency), 2011, viewed 22 February 2013, http://climatecommission.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/The-Critical-Decade_July-revision_Low-res.pdf

[ii] D Nuccitelli, ‘Climate scientists erring on the side of least drama’, Skeptical Science (blog), 30 January 2013, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.skepticalscience.com/climate-scientists-esld.html

[iii] JE Hansen, M Sato, P Kharecha, D Beerling, R Berner, V Masson-Delmotte M Pagini, M Raymo, DL Royer, & JC Zachos, ‘Target atmospheric CO2: Where should humanity aim?’, Open Atmospheric Science Journal, vol. 2 (2008), pp. 217-231, viewed 21 February 2013, http://arxiv.org/abs/0804.1126

[iv] Earth System Research Laboratory, ‘Recent Global CO2’, Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2013, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/global.html

[v] J Hansen, P Kharecha, M Sato, F Ackerman, PJ Hearty, O Hough-Guldberg, S-L Hsu, F Krueger, C Parmesan, S Rahmstorf, J Rockstrom, EJ Rohling, J Sachs, P Smith, K Steffen, LV Susteren, K von Schuckmann, & JC Zachos, ‘Scientific case for avoiding dangerous climate change to protect young people and nature’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, in press, viewed 12 August 2012, http://arxiv.org/abs/1110.1365

[vi] J Hansen, R Ruedy, M Sato, K Lo, ‘Global surface temperature change’, Rev. Geophys., vol. 48 (2010), RG4004, http://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2010/2010_Hansen_etal.pdf

[vii] G Schmidt, ‘Climate change commitment II’, RealClimate (blog), 2 June 2010, viewed 22 February 2013, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2010/06/climate-change-commitment-ii/

[viii] D Spratt, ‘Arctic sea-ice melt record more than broken, it’s being smashed’, Climate Code Red (blog), 25 August 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.climatecodered.org/2012/08/arctic-sea-ice-melt-record-more-than.html

[ix] S Carana, ‘How British government’s climate forecasting MET Office gets the Arctic wrong’, Climate Code Red (blog), 20 September 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.climatecodered.org/2012/09/how-british-governments-climate.html

[x] D Spratt, ‘All gone by 2015? Welcome to the Arctic end times’, Renew Economy, 30 August 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://reneweconomy.com.au/2012/all-gone-by-2015-welcome-to-the-arctic-end-times-44411

[xi] Neven & K McKinney, ‘Why Arctic sea ice shouldn’t leave anyone cold’, Arctic Sea Ice Blog, 26 August 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://neven1.typepad.com/blog/2012/08/wasislac.html

[xii] M-J Viñas, Satellites See Unprecedented Greenland Ice Sheet Surface Melt, NASA, 24 July 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/greenland-melt.html

[xiii] A Robinson, R Calov, & A Ganopolski, ‘Multistability and critical thresholds of the Greenland ice sheet’, Nature Climate Change, vol. 2 (2012), pp. 429-432, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/335/6071/956

[xiv] B Cubby, ‘At the edge of disaster’, Age, 28 November 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.theage.com.au/national/at-the-edge-of-disaster-20121127-2a5xe.html

[xv] J Hansen & M Sato, ‘Paleoclimate implications for human-made climate change’, Climate Change at the Eve of the Second Decade of the Century: Inferences from Paleoclimate and Regional Aspects: Proceedings of Milutin Milankovitch 130th Anniversary Symposium, 2012, pp. 21-47, viewed 22 February 2013, http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.0968

[xvi] Climate Commission, Loss of Arctic sea ice indicates global risks from climate change, 2012, viewed 13 November 2013, http://climatecommission.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/Climate-Commission-Arctic-sea-ice-summary.pdf

[xvii] RE Kopp, FJ Simons, JX Mitrovica, AC Maloof & R Oppenheimer, ‘Probabilistic assessment of sea level during the last interglacial stage’, Nature, vol. 462 (2009), pp. 863-867, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v462/n7275/full/nature08686.html

[xviii] A Dutton & K Lambeck, ‘Ice volume and sea level during the last interglacial’, Science, vol. 337 (2012), pp. 216-219, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/337/6091/216.abstract

[xix] G Schmidt, ‘Climate change commitment II’, RealClimate (blog), 2 June 2010, viewed 22 February 2013, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2010/06/climate-change-commitment-ii/

[xx] J Hansen, P Kharecha, M Sato, F Ackerman, PJ Hearty, O Hough-Guldberg, S-L Hsu, F Krueger, C Parmesan, S Rahmstorf, J Rockstrom, EJ Rohling, J Sachs, P Smith, K Steffen, LV Susteren, K von Schuckmann, & JC Zachos, ‘Scientific case for avoiding dangerous climate change to protect young people and nature’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, in press, viewed 12 August 2012, http://arxiv.org/abs/1110.1365v3

[xxi] United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, viewed 9 September 2012, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf, p. 4.

[xxii] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention’ in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, United Nations, viewed 12 August 2012, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf

[xxiii] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action’ in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011, United Nations, viewed 12 August 2012, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf

[xxiv] M Levi, ‘A misplaced climate celebration in Durban’, Energy, Security, and Climate (blog), 11December 2011, viewed 12 August 2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2011/12/11/a-misplaced-climate-celebration-in-durban/

[xxv] Climate Action Tracker, Emissions gap looks set to increase if government action doesn’t step up, Climate Analytics, 2012, viewed 12 August 2012, http://climateactiontracker.org/news/126/Emissions-gap-looks-set-to-increase-if-government-action-doesnt-step-up.html

[xxvi] The Climate Scoreboard, Climate Interactive, 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://climateinteractive.org/scoreboard

[xxvii] Earth System Research Laboratory, ‘Recent Global CO2’, Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2013, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/global.html

[xxviii] Global Carbon Project, Global Carbon Budget 2012, 3 December 2012, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/12/files/CarbonBudget2012.pdf

[xxix] Carbon Tracker Initiative, Unburnable Carbon: Are the world’s financial markets carrying a carbon bubble?, 2011, viewed 9 September 2012, http://www.carbontracker.org/linkfileshare/Unburnable-Carbon-Full1.pdf

[xxx] Climate Commission, Avoiding the Unadaptable: a 4°C world, Australian Government, 2012, viewed 22 February 2013, http://climatecommission.gov.au/others/avoiding-unadaptable-a-4-degree-celsius-world/

[xxxi] J Hansen & M Sato, Earth’s Climate History: Implications for Tomorrow, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 2011, viewed 22 February 2013, http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/briefs/hansen_15/

[xxxii] M Medina-Elizalde & EJ Rohling, ‘Collapse of Classic Maya civilization related to modest reduction in participation’, Science, vol. 335 (2012), no. 6071, pp. 956-959, viewed 21 February 2013, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/335/6071/956

[xxxiii] J Hansen & M Sato, ‘Paleoclimate implications for human-made climate change’, Climate Change at the Eve of the Second Decade of the Century: Inferences from Paleoclimate and Regional Aspects: Proceedings of Milutin Milankovitch 130th Anniversary Symposium, 2012, pp. 21-47, viewed 22 February 2013, http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.0968

[xxxiv] J Hansen & M Sato, ‘Paleoclimate implications for human-made climate change’, Climate Change at the Eve of the Second Decade of the Century: Inferences from Paleoclimate and Regional Aspects: Proceedings of Milutin Milankovitch 130th Anniversary Symposium, 2012, pp. 21-47, viewed 22 February 2013, http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.0968

Meating a wicked problem

Sun, 24 Feb 2013 09:00:00 EST

Meat is an integral part of human diet in most countries, but the vast majority of people who eat meat in Westernised cultures avoid direct participation in the processes of killing and preparing dead animals. This has led to extensive ethical discussion in academic journals and ongoing scrutiny of the subject in the media. Debate tends to polarize into blame and defensiveness as vegans/vegetarians face of against meat eaters in bitter arguments, and criticism of slaughter practices in the Australian press is often deflected onto other cultures and places.

The meat industry in fact presents a ‘wicked problem’ and, in any imaginable future short of using Star Trek’s food replicators, it will continue to be a wicked problem. Wicked problems are complex and stubborn, and have significant social dimensions. These problems cannot be solved by applying science, technology, or accepted direct reasoning processes. Discussions around them is ongoing, but essentially the framing of the problem can change any proposed solution because there are multiple vested interests. (Rittel and Webber, 1973) The focus in this discussion of the wicked problem is on the difficulties of working in the abattoir, but that work needs to be considered through history and context. In catering for the modern dependency on meat, an industry has been built that creates public risk, leaves those working in it carrying an unfair part of the burden in what are essentially hidden, difficult and shunned activities, and contributes significantly to human and non-human suffering.

In 1906 Upton Sinclair published a novel that has since become a classic. Entitled The Jungle, it is the story of Jurgis Rudkus, his family and their lives after they emigrate from Lithuania to America and become employees in the Chicago stockyards and meatpacking plants. Sinclair wrote the book on assignment from a socialist magazine, spending seven weeks working in the yards to document the conditions of migrant workers, the standards of the meat packing industry and the corruption in the city at the time. He wrote describing a period of dreadful poverty and troubled industrial relations. (Sinclair, 1906, 2004) However, Sinclair contributed to important social change as laws were passed soon after his book became a best seller – laws about food quality, meat inspection and child labour. The Humane Slaughter Act took much longer, but was finally passed in 1958.

Despite this legislative success, the stubborn practical problems Sinclair identified in the industry remain. In 1997, Gail Eisnitz, from the Humane Farming Association in America, published an expose entitled Slaughterhouse: the Shocking Story of Greed, Neglect and Inhumane Treatment inside the US Meat Industry. The book was republished in 2006, and reveals continuing poor standards of meat inspection and dreadful animal cruelty, such as cows being skinned alive. Like Sinclair’s book it also details corruption in the industry and an extensive system of ‘payola’. (Eisnitz, 1997, 2006) In 2011, Timothy Pachirat wrote Every Twelve Seconds, another deep ethnographic investigation into the industry with its predominantly ethnic workers, and animal ‘disassembly’ lines. The conclusion of his research is clear: industrialised abattoirs in America have still not managed to control issues of corruption, poor food quality, worker exploitation or animal cruelty. (Pachirat, 2011)

In Australia, the picture has been slightly different, but the last three years has seen regular negative publicity about domestic slaughterhouse workers and animal abuse. The live sheep and cattle trades are a running political sore because of disagreements over national and international animal handling and Australia’s meat trade suffers blows with every unpleasant story. When live exports to Indonesia were stopped in 2011, a Quarterly Essay by Anna Krien, entitled ‘Us and Them’ was later dedicated largely to explaining the cross cultural handling of Australian cattle in the physical environments of slaughterhouses in Indonesia. Her literary and affect-based documentation of the process did not completely defuse the problem but it did help to reduce demonization of the overseas workers and allay the worst public anxieties about the process. (Krien, 2012)

Contextualise these very specific national concerns about animal handling with potentially global pandemic health risks like SARS, mad cow disease and avian flu that have emerged from slaughterhouses and food processing and we really see that the meat and animal food industry is massively troubled. And confront even dedicated meat eaters with Pachirat’s 2009 statistics of over 8,520,225,000 chickens, 113, 600,000 pigs, 33, 300,000 cattle, 944,200 calves and 245,768,000 turkeys per year killed for food and it gives pause for thought. In words, that is over eight thousand five hundred million chickens, over one hundred and thirteen and a half million pigs, and so on, and more have been killed each year since. These are animals that live and die as a food source for another species. They have no purpose or autonomous existence beyond a human dinner plate. This is the way it has been since farming and food production became a heavily industrialised process. This is not the way it has always been, and that bears thinking about when considering the psychology of workers. As humans we have been programmed biologically to be part of a complex ecosystem and have spent our development in very different relationships with animals than those we have now.

Looking at the continuing history of environmental, social and ethical problems within the industry, and the complexity and scale of them, it is important that we continue to develop new conversations. Although personal food choices are a valid aspect of this subject, it is necessary to move beyond them. To allow discussion to continually collapse into defensive/aggressive individual morality games around meat is not helpful. To assume that policy protects the vulnerable in the bloody centre of such an industrial juggernaut is naiive. To think that cows have a nationality that entitles them to special treatment in the face of these global statistics becomes absurd. Approaches are needed that will allow reframing – a shift, if you will, into a different paradigm, a different way of seeing what we do, why we do it and how we do it.

New strategies need to be built to approach industrial meat production and engage consumers. Attitudes to the industry need to be explored, and asking questions can be the start of a process that will reveal unexplored cultural assumptions, power discrepancies or contradictory attitudes. And these questions, and the answers they provoke, will provide tools for re-evaluating different aspects of the wicked problem presented by slaughterhouses and meat processing.

An example of anomalous thinking and behavior connected to the industry can be found around the question of cattle and freedom. Pachirat tells the story of six cows escaping a holding yard in Nebraska. One ran to a neighboring slaughterhouse yard and was gunned down by police. Employees from that slaughterhouse witnessed the killing and were angry and upset. A disruption to the normal running of the business situated the cow as a threat that had to be violently dealt with by law enforcement officers, and workers who kill and process thousands of cattle a year were shocked by the brutality they had seen. This incident of animal escape and the public discussion that attended it is not unique. Last year an escaped slaughterhouse cow in Bavaria was given the name Yvonne and now exists at the centre of a controversy between hunters, who have been given the right to shoot her on sight, and animal lovers who see her freedom as a powerful victory symbol in a dehumanizing system.

Workers also carry complicated burdens of conflicted feelings for the rest of the culture. Those who kill animals or deal with the animal products in non-Western cultures often form a lower or ‘untouchable’ group. While this separation does not occur in a formal sense in modern Westernised societies, reactions to media exposure of incidents of animal abuse in Australian slaughterhouses tend to generate revulsion in the general public and discussions are not particularly sympathetic to slaughterhouse workers. Putting aside the suspect rhetoric of ‘isolated incidents’ that gets trotted out at times like this, some awareness of the slaughterhouse worker’s situation seems to be in order.

This is not a job that many people want to do and it is not a job that many people can do for any length of time. All of the deep ethnography accounts from those who have done their work in slaughterhouses point out that strong coping mechanisms are often used: drinking alcohol, using drugs, fights amongst workers, brutality to other workers and the animals, and grim humour. Upton Sinclair, in The Jungle, says of the tendency to violence:

…men who have to crack the heads of animals all day seem to get into the habit, and to practice on their friends, and even on their families, between times …

Investigating what Sinclair wrote, recent research has compared employees in other assembly line work with slaughterhouse worker populations and has found a higher incidence of violent crime in the latter. This is not simple cause/effect research but an analysis that records higher rates of arrest for violent crimes, rape and other sex offences in a significant cross industry comparison. (Fitgerald, Kalof and Dietz, 2011) In turn, these findings can be linked directly to other research which suggests that animal abuse is connected to intra-human violence. (Beirn, 2004) As slaughterhouse worker populations are often immigrants and from lower socio-economic classes this connection between occupation and increased levels of violent crime can very easily be masked by more familiar ways of reading statistics describing socio-economic disadvantage.

Also, the specifics of the jobs within the slaughterhouse have gradations of difficulty that are not generally recognized. Sinclair’s story from early last century describes the work environments as open, and the killing and dismembering of large animals as easily visible, and even on display to visitors. Pachirat points out that now, not only does punitive legislation ensure controlled access to these sites, the buildings and processes of the industry conceal the more difficult processes of killing even from its own employees. As he puts it, the killing of the animals is ‘psychologically and morally segregated’ from the other work of the slaughterhouse to preserve the safety and sanity of the workers. When Pachirat says he wants to be trained in ‘knocking’, killing the cattle, his more experienced friend tells him bluntly he doesn’t: “Because, man, that’s killing … that shit will fuck you up for real.’

So the burden of the worst of this work becomes even more concentrated on an ever smaller group of slaughterhouse workers. A group of workers that surely require special attention as having to endure extreme challenges on a daily basis that could affect the quality of their lives and – in turn – impact on vulnerable people within their own families and social circles, and upon the vulnerable living creatures they must handle to their end. But accessing and describing this world is not simple and depends largely upon anecdotal accounts with little formal recognition in industrial relations or psychology. The material that is there suggests that perpetration-induced trauma may be useful in thinking through the abattoir worker experience.

Post-traumatic stress is now widely recognized in the history in the psychology of human conflict reaching back to the first World War, and presents potential symptoms of intrusive distressing recollections, numbing, avoidance or bursts of anger after experiences of fear, helplessness or horror. There is no current confirmed connection between abattoir workers and post-traumatic stress disorder; however, recent work suggests a possible link to perpetration-induced traumatic stress, a related disorder that focuses on the trauma of those who kill. Rachel McNair offers an overview of occupations that might legitimately be studied for the psychological effects of killing. These include policemen who kill in the line of duty, euthanasia doctors in Holland, Abortion practitioners, and some animal workers who must euthanize healthy animals. (McNair, 2002) Separate articles have been written accounting for perpetrator-induced stress in animal shelter workers and in veterinarians who have to destroy healthy animals. ( Rholf, 2005, Whiting, 2011) Slaughterhouse workers must also repeatedly kill healthy animals and could potentially be a group dealing with extra stressors in their work as a result. Again, this is already suggested in the studies of raised levels of violent crime in slaughterhouse communities, so perpetrator-induced traumatic stress maybe a potential pathway for understanding their particular predicament.

Although this proposed pathway is hypothetical, it presents an opportunity to extend the conversation about the industry and to focus constructively (as opposed to sensationally) on the workers in the industry and their experiences. Slaughterhouses and meat processing generate complicated practical, philosophical, ethical and social problems that travel across cultures and affect millions of humans and non-humans. To allow it to continue to be conducted purely as an economic activity and consign its management to those concerned only with productivity is culturally short sighted. Not only could such short sighted thinking result in ever greater health threats to the planet’s human population in the forseeable future, it is cruel and unjust to ignore the monstrous burden it creates for a few people, and to pretend that the animals processed do not suffer due to this situation is willful blindness. Please let’s talk.

References

Eisnitz, Gail. Slaughterhouse: The Shocking Story of Greed, Neglect, and Inhumane Treatment inside the U.S. Meat Industry. New York: Prrometheus Books, 2006.

Krien, Anna. "Us and Them: On the Importance of Animals." Quarterly Essay 45 (2012): 1-85.

McNair, Rachel. Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress: The Psychological Consequences of Killing. Psychological Dimensions of War and Peace. Edited by Harvey Langholtz New York: Authors Choice Press, 2005. 2002.

Pachirat, Timothy. Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialised Slaughter and the Politics of Sight. Yale Agrarian Studies Series. Edited by James C. Scott New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.

Rittel, Horst W.J. and Melvin M. Webber "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning." Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 155-69.

Rohlf, Vanessa and Pauleen Bennett. "Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress in Persons Who Euthanise Nonhuman Animals in Surgeries, Animal Shelters and Laboratories." Society and Animals 13, no. 3 (2005): 201-20.

Sinclair, Upton. The Jungle. Edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004. 1906.

Whiting, Terry L. and Colleen R. Marion. "Perpetation-Induced Traumatic Stress - a Risk for Veterinarians Involved in the Destruction of Healthy Animals." The Canadian Veterinary Journal 52, no. 7 (July 2011): 794-96.

The involvement of conspiracist ideation in science denial

Tue, 5 Feb 2013 00:00:00 EST

There is growing evidence that conspiratorial thinking, also known as conspiracist ideation, is often involved in the rejection of scientific propositions. Conspiracist ideations tend to invoke alternative explanations for the nature or source of the scientific evidence. For example, among people who reject the link between HIV and AIDS, common ideations involve the beliefs that AIDS was created by the U.S. Government.

My colleagues and I published a paper recently that found evidence for the involvement of conspiracist ideation in the rejection of scientific propositions—from climate change to the link between tobacco and lung cancer, and between HIV and AIDS—among visitors to climate blogs. This was a fairly unsurprising result because it meshed well with previous research and the existing literature on the rejection of science. Indeed, it would have been far more surprising, from a scientific perspective, if the article had not found a link between conspiracist ideation and rejection of science.

Nonetheless, as some readers of this blog may remember, this article engendered considerable controversy.

The article also generated data.

Data, because for social scientists, public statements and publically-expressed ideas constitute data for further research. Cognitive scientists sometimes apply something called “narrative analysis” to understand how people, groups, or societies are organized and how they think.

In the case of the response to our earlier paper, we were struck by the way in which some of the accusations leveled against our paper were, well, somewhat conspiratorial in nature. We therefore decided to analyze the public response to our first paper with the hypothesis in mind that this response might also involve conspiracist ideation. We systematically collected utterances by bloggers and commenters, and we sought to classify them into various hypotheses leveled against our earlier paper. For each hypothesis, we then compared the public statements against a list of criteria for conspiracist ideation that was taken from the previous literature.

This follow-up paper was accepted a few days ago by Frontiers in Psychology, and a preliminary version of the paper is already available, for open access, here.

The title of the paper is Recursive fury: Conspiracist ideation in the blogosphere in response to research on conspiracist ideation, and it is authored by myself, John Cook, Klaus Oberauer, and Michael Marriott.

I enclose the abstract below:

Conspiracist ideation has been repeatedly implicated in the rejection of scientific propositions, although empirical evidence to date has been sparse. A recent study involving visitors to climate blogs found that conspiracist ideation was associated with the rejection of climate science and the rejection of other scientific propositions such as the link between lung cancer and smoking, and between HIV and AIDS (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, in press; LOG12 from here on). This article analyzes the response of the climate blogosphere to the publication of LOG12. We identify and trace the hypotheses that emerged in response to LOG12 and that questioned the validity of the paper's conclusions. Using established criteria to identify conspiracist ideation, we show that many of the hypotheses exhibited conspiratorial content and counterfactual thinking. For example, whereas hypotheses were initially narrowly focused on LOG12, some ultimately grew in scope to include actors beyond the authors of LOG12, such as university executives, a media organization, and the Australian government. The overall pattern of the blogosphere's response to LOG12 illustrates the possible role of conspiracist ideation in the rejection of science, although alternative scholarly interpretations may be advanced in the future.

Emotive Short-Circuitry vs. Deliberative Reasoning: The Australian vs. the ABC

Thu, 27 Dec 2012 09:00:00 EST

Updated 1/1/13

Analogies are a mainstay of human communication and reasoning. In science, Niels Bohr used an analogy with the solar system to explain the structure of atoms. In everyday language, analogies help us make a point effortlessly: It is obvious what it means to say that “Bing Cosby has a velvet voice” or that someone is “as annoying as fingernails on a blackboard”, even though voices aren’t made of fabric and people’s personalities don’t consist of fingernails.

However, there is a flipside to the ease with which people process analogies: Because they are so important to our reasoning and communication, we can sometimes be fooled into perceiving an analogy when there is none—simply because two terms presented in close proximity are similar to each other or are emotionally laden. According to many cognitive theorists those two aspects of the processing of analogies arise because we have two systems of reasoning: One very rapid system that relies on relatively shallow analysis of stimuli, which allows us to respond in situations in which time is at a premium, and another one that requires slow deliberation but is guided by more complex rules. Arguably, the former may be triggered by emotive stimuli, because emotion may serve as a “stopping rule” for reasoning—in a nutshell, the more emotion, the less deliberation.

This distinction between two different modes of reasoning is not just dry laboratory science but can also be observed in the public arena. This can be illustrated with recent public controversy involving some of the most toxic and emotive issues of our times that involved Australia’s only national newspaper (The Australian), the national broadcaster (the ABC), and at least indirectly also me.

In May 2012, The Australian ran an opinion piece by Mr James Delingpole in which he riled against wind energy under the title “wind farm scam a huge cover-up.” Wind turbines actually constitute an increasingly important tool in our arsenal of alternative energy to wean the planet off fossil fuels; however, Mr. Dellingpole begs to differ. Among other arguments, Mr. Delingpole cited an unnamed Australian sheep farmer’s opinion that “The wind-farm business is bloody well near a pedophile ring. They're f . . king our families and knowingly doing so."

Yes, that did appear exactly as quoted in The Australian.

The use of “is” to connect one concept (“wind-farm business”) to another (“pedophile ring”) leaves little doubt that this statement was intended as an analogy. Any remaining doubt evaporates with the graphic description of what is being done to families by pedophiles and wind energy alike. By engaging our deliberative system of reasoning, we can identify this analogy quite clearly.

Let’s turn to another apparent analogy that was splattered across The Australian’s front page a few days ago under the headline ”It’s OK to link climate denial to pedophilia, ABC tells ex-chairman”: Did the ABC really draw an analogy between climate denial and pedophilia?

Clearly, some journalists and the ABC’s former chairman thought so. But did this opinion reflect deliberation or might it have been their rapid system misfiring because the emotiveness of the issue got the better of them?

Let’s find out. The ABC’s Science Show on 24 November opened with the words “What if I told you that pedophilia is good for children, or that asbestos is an excellent inhalant for those with asthma? Or that smoking crack is a normal part and a healthy one of teenage life, to be encouraged? You'd rightly find it outrageous. But there have been similar statements coming out of inexpert mouths again and again in recent times, distorting the science.”

The presenter, Robyn Williams, then proceeded to cite an Economist article about American politicians, among them one staunch foe of abortion who believes that the “bodies of women subjected to rape can shut down a pregnancy.”

Only later in the show did Mr. Williams turn to climate change, by interviewing me about my research which seeks to explain why people deny the overwhelming evidence about the fact that the climate is changing and that humans are causing it. (Full disclosure: the interview was pre-recorded and I had no advance knowledge of or input to anything preceding it on air.)

So did the Science Show link pedophilia to climate denial by way of an analogy? Did Mr. Williams suggest that climate denial is akin to pedophilia, the way that wind energy was linked to a pedophile ring in the pages of The Australian?

No.

To see why not, let’s engage our deliberate reasoning system and amend the opening of the Science Show by replacing the emotive trigger words thus: “What if I told you that lamp posts are made of chocolate, or that armchairs are an excellent tranquilizer? Or that tractors make great pets?”

Would this link climate denial to lampposts, armchairs, and tractors?

No. Instead, it links climate denial to statements that most people would recognize as being false or outrageous. Drawing that analogy is appropriate because much of climate denial is recognized as false or outrageous by people who are familiar with the scientific process or the peer-reviewed literature.

This actual analogy was lost on some listeners of the Science Show and the headline writers of The Australian because the emotive keywords of the opening statements overpowered analysis of what was actually said. Instead, the emotive content of the key words triggered the rapid reasoning system and tricked it into perceiving an analogy where there was none.

The ABC, by contrast, engaged its deliberative reasoning system and came to much the same conclusion as the preceding analysis, noting that there is no equivalence between the piece in The Australian and the ABC’s science show.

The saga does not end there.

A few days ago, The Australian received an adjudication by the Australian Press Council against them for likening wind energy to pedophilia in the piece mentioned above. This slap on the wrist was promptly followed by another piece in The Australian by the same author who unrepentantly declared “I stand by every word of the piece – especially the bit about paedophiles. I would concede that the analogy may be somewhat offensive to the paedophile community.”

No ambiguity there, this is the deliberative reasoning system wantingly, and wantonly, drawing an analogy between wind energy and pedophilia. There really are people like that out there, and they are given an opportunity to publish in Australia’s national newspaper.

But that doesn’t mean The Australian will publish just about anything, however bizarre or pornographic it may be. Far from it, The Australian is quite capable of editorial restraint. For example, they elected not to run the statement from the ABC that very calmly explained the difference between an analogy and emotive short-circuitry.

Update 1/1/13: On the day this post went up, The Australian did publish the letter from the ABC, 3 days after the ABC posted that the letter had been declined. The premise underlying the last paragraph of this post is therefore now outdated and hence no longer valid.

Worldviews and the (Economic) Merchants of Doubt

Thu, 20 Dec 2012 14:00:00 EST

In the previous two posts, I made two principal points: In the first post, I noted that doubt about the efficacy of government intervention to address HICC may become as much a barrier to action as the denialist strategy of manufacturing doubt about the scientific basis of climate change. In the second post, I illustated this notion by surveying the range of climate policie across the entire spectrum.

In this final post, I take up the roles of worldviews and ideologies, and how they may give rise to a new type of "merchants of doubt" in the economic realm.

The concepts of worldviews and ideologies are central to the full analysis of the climate change issue. In his recent review of the role of psychology in limiting the impact of climate change, Stern made the point that “values, attitudes, beliefs, worldviews, and emotional reactions” (Stern 2011, p. 309) are crucial players in policy and that “public support for policies to limit climate change is associated with environmental worldviews and fundamental values” (Stern 2011, p. 309). He also remarks that, “Opposition to such policies is also linked to values and political ideology” (Stern 2011, p. 309).

I would go further and say that values, worldviews and ideologies are associated with all policy responses to Human-Induced Climate Change (HICC).

Both left wing and right wing and even third way ideologies are involved here. For example, the free market policy response to climate change has many connections with the ideological movement towards neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism that has been a feature of economic thinking over several decades.

Some form of what might be called “free marketism” is probably a relatively common ideological position even amongst those who recognise the reality of HICC and know that the science is valid. This is particularly relevant in the economics discipline where free-market driven policies responses to climate change are frequently espoused. It is particularly important here to recognise that different ideological positions are held by different scientists even when they agree on the science. Rational individuals listen to and defer to the opinions of the overwhelming majority of climate scientists who propose that HICC is real and that its impacts are significant and wide-ranging.

What should the response be, however, when highly respected scientists, including economists, engineers, chemists and agricultural scientists, agree that HICC is real but differ greatly with respect to the policy response to this threat. There may be a solid consensus among climate scientists that HICC is real but there is no consensus at all among scientists on the next most crucial question – What should we do about it?

So let me bring this issue of worldview and ideology back to the spectrum of policy responses. I have argued that the ideologically-driven battle over whether climate change is real or not will now be replaced by an ideologically-driven battle over what should be done about it. In particular, those who shape public policy including academics, and who all agree that HICC is real, will increasingly be divided in terms of their ideologies and worldviews and how these factors inform their respective positions on policy responses. The different sides of the political spectrum will now both be able to claim (quite accurately) that there is strong scientific support for their opposing positions.

The danger is that ideologies that underpin market-based policies, and which are also associated with denialist positions, will again work to cast doubt over what climate policies are to be implemented and, more particularly, over whether they should be government lead or market lead. The "merchants of doubt" will not focus their attention on issues of science but on issues of policy. As I pointed out in the figure in the previous post, shown again below, the place on the policy spectrum where this becomes most crucial is where market-based policy (the C threshold) engages with a mixed policy position (the D threshold).

What will this battle look like?

First, the battle will not be between expert climate scientists and self-educated bloggers. Nor will it be between “warmists” and “deniers”. The lines that will separate the opponents in this emerging front will be more difficult to identify. The battle will be between, on the one hand, intelligent and highly respected scientists, politicians and business people who calmly argue that HICC is real and that both government policies and private actions are needed and, on the other hand, intelligent and highly respected scientists, politicians and business people who calmly argue that HICC is real and that markets will determine the best way to respond.

In other words, the contest will be between those who want real action through government intervention and business and community action, and those who want real action by the invisible hand of the market only.

The new economic "Merchants of Doubt"

This will be a major issue because this second group, the free marketeers, will cast doubt on the need for deliberate and targeted regulation of economic activity. In essence, the free-marketeers will argue that nothing should be done because the market will naturally sort out the best response in the most efficient and effective manner. The free marketeers are the new (economic) merchants of doubt because they will bring uncertainty, suspicion, and distrust to whether any specific action should be taken to address HICC and to the motives for doing so. The really difficult issue here is that unlike the debate between the climate scientists and the denier bloggers, this debate will be between respected scientists who differ only in their scientific worldviews. The debate will be based not on the acceptance or rejection of science but on the more difficult territory of what kind of scientific worldview a scientist/economist holds and bases their research on.

As societies all over the planet grapple with the questions of “what” should be done (e.g., tax or direct action), “how” should it be done (e.g., government or markets), and “who” should do it (e.g., individuals, companies, governments, international bodies), perhaps the most crucial issue of all will once again get lost in the furore: “When” should action be taken is the most crucial issue in climate change because the more action is delayed the less any of the other questions matter. This is why the debate over HICC and the casting of doubt over the science has been so destructive and why the new debate over how action should be driven may have similar reprehensible repercussions.

The market-lead HICC supporters will cast doubt over concerted and timely (if that is any longer possible) government and community-based action and once again this will lead to inaction. Many long-standing social problems have festered for decades due to debates over whether government or the private sector should act to solve these issues. These include child and adult obesity and advertising, inequality and poverty, homelessness, environmental degradation and the loss of indigenous heritage. In recent decades the pendulum has swung much more towards corporate self-regulation rather than government regulation, towards market-lead solutions rather than community-lead solutions. The same equivocation will probably be the case with the climate response debate.

The role of economists will be increasingly important in all this as the need for economic intervention and government direction setting becomes more urgent. One important group who will argue for the market-lead response to climate change will be conservative economists. Although the great majority will agree that HICC is occurring, we will also hear from this group a range of arguments against direct government-lead action to address climate change. These arguments will appear in many forms but they will tap into the usual psychological biases and weaknesses that previous doubt merchants have preyed upon (Gifford 2011). The arguments of the new merchants of doubt (e.g. economists who support HICC and argue for market lead “policy” response) will raise doubt and bring about inaction.

This will create a very difficult barrier for those wanting to take targeted action to address HICC.

One very real and unpalatable possibility here is that a new anti-climate-change alliance will emerge between the radical denialists and those with a scientific and rational perspective on HICC but who endorse the free market response. Two powerful forces may bring these two groups into an expedient coalition. First, both will share free-market ideologies and so government regulation of climate change policy will be anathema to their worldviews. This will occur irrespective of whether they hold a scientific or anti-scientific worldview. The connections they have in believing that government regulation needs to be minimised at all cost will override any divergent views they have about the scientific validity of climate science. Second, money and the funding of research will form a convenient bridge between radical denialists and scientists seeking backing for their research.

My prediction is that corporate and private funding of hyper-technologies and geo-engineering efforts such as carbon sequestration and sulphate seeding of the upper atmosphere will increase dramatically in the coming years. Again, the outcome of all this will be to stymie direct government-led legislation and regulation to maintain the status quo of free-market operations.

In summary, the climate change policy spectrum shows that the battlelines of the climate wars will shift and new alliances will be forged as the need for climate action and intervention in markets and economies inevitable grows. In particular, it shows that the analysis of worldviews, values, scientific paradigms and political ideologies will take centre stage in our response to HICC. The need for a deeper understanding of how our metatheories and worldviews affect the choices and decision we make will become ever more crucial as the urgency of action escalates.

References

Gifford, R 2011, 'The dragons of inaction: Psychological barriers that limit climate change mitigation and adaptation', American Psychologist, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 290-302.

Stern, P 2011, 'Contributions of Psychology to Limiting Climate Change', The American Psychologist, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 303-314.

Climate Policy: Points along the Spectrum

Mon, 17 Dec 2012 14:00:00 EST

In a previous post, I noted that doubt about the efficacy of government intervention to address HICC may become as much a barrier to action as the denialist strategy of manufacturing doubt about the scientific basis of Human Induced Climate Change (HICC).

In this post I expand on that possibility by describing a few more features of the policy response spectrum.

Let’s consider some of the issues that will occur as realities force the need for a co-ordinated policy response to HICC. As we move along the policy response spectrum from inaction to action, we reach a number of interesting thresholds where shifts in policy positions emerge. Referring to Figure 2 below, these thresholds points include:

A: This is the extreme denialist position which is typically anti-government, anti-regulation and ideologically opposed to government interventions of most kinds. The influence of advocates of this position has been discussed previously by Naomi Oreskes (Oreskes & Conway 2010) and others.

B: Moving further we come to the point where global warming is acknowledged but its anthropogenic cause is denied. This end of the policy response spectrum maintains that warming is part of the natural cycle of global environmental change and that the recent increase in surface temperatures is not caused by human activity. Attributing climate change to natural causes means that no policy response is required or even desirable because it will have no effect and consequently be a waste of resources that could be better channelled towards adapting to the impact of unavoidable climate change.

C: The next major threshold is where the scientific evidence for HICC is recognised but the policy response is driven by a market-oriented worldview. At C a person completely accepts the science behind HICC but rejects government intervention in favour of allowing market forces to drive what changes need to occur. The market here is king and government intervention is seen as inefficient and ineffective because it results in unwarranted costs and unintended consequences that damage business, shrink profits and reduce a society’s economic capacity to do the things it needs to do. Government is seen as the problem not part of the solution.

D: Recognising the need for both government and markets to actively take steps to address HICC is the next key threshold along the policy response spectrum. At D a person sees government intervention, business regulation and legislated policy as essential elements for guiding markets in the right direction. Moreover, at D, markets and businesses are also regarded as important players in their own right and that markets can take leadership roles, create technological innovations and produce momentum for change that governments cannot emulate or control. D is the threshold point where a balanced mix of climate change policy responses, both interventionist and market-based, is acknowledged.

E: Next comes the position where government is seen as the arbiter of policy settings and that, while consultation with business and community is required, it is the role of government to set the legislative agenda for change. E is the point at which a person says the implications of HICC are so significant that governments must not just send markets signals through taxation and carbon market mechanisms but must legislate for whole-of-system changes that force business and economic systems towards carbon neutrality.

F: Moving still further along the spectrum we come to the point where markets are seen as the problem and not part of the solution. Market forces are seen as completely inadequate for driving the shift towards carbon-neutral economies and that governments must unilaterally require systemic change. Here the urgency of the climate change issue demands direct and even authoritarian government intervention to shift economies from fossil fuel energy sources to alternative energy systems.

The ideological and worldview divide between interventionist and free market positions will shift across these different thresholds as the urgency and scale of adequate policy responses grows. A few points can be made about the current situation in Australia and other countries using this spectrum.

The major battle over climate is/will not between those who deny and those who accept climate change but between those who want targeted and deliberate action and those who want to leave it to the market.
At this point in Australia and in several other countries the battles lines in terms of the public debate still lie somewhere between thresholds B and C.
The policy battle, however, is between points C and D - between those who want a mix of government, community and market lead action and those who want to leave it all up to market forces.
Policies reliant on market forces are in contention with a more mixed policy response where the government role is formally acknowledged. This being so, the greatest obstruction to proactive policy development and implementation will not come, and perhaps already does not come, from the denialist position on the spectrum (points A and B) but from those who acknowledge HICC while also advocating for free market solutions.

I believe that it is from this quarter, from those who agree with HICC and, at the same time, deny the interventionist role of government, who present the biggest obstacle to taking the level of action required to seriously address the climate crisis.

In the next post, I will explain the reasons underlying this hypothesis by considering the role of worldviews and ideologies.

Reference

Oreskes, N & Conway, EM 2010, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handfull of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, Bloomsbury Press, New York.

The Climate Change Policy Spectrum: Worldviews, Ideologies and the New (Economic) Merchants of Doubt

Thu, 13 Dec 2012 09:00:00 EST

In a study of the responses of farmers to changing weather patterns Rogers, Curtis and Mazur found that, “Personal values and worldviews were found to be the most frequent factors linked to adaptive behaviour.” (Rogers, Curtis & Mazur 2012, p. 258)

This is the first post in a three-part series that examine the policy spectrum that emerges from the landscape of values and worldviews.

Policy responses to human induced climate change (HICC) cover a spectrum of views ranging from the radical denier’s dismissal of any need for policy to the radical interventionist call for policies that require immediate and wide-ranging transformation of the economic system (see Figure 1). Because they fear the effects of devastating climate change over the coming decades, radical interventionists call for policies that will require a mandatory shift away from a carbon-based economy. Radical interventionists generally hold the view that immediate and harsh, perhaps even authoritarian, government action is required to avoid the catastrophic environmental, social and economic disruption that will unfold if climate change continues unabated. At the other end of the spectrum, the radical deniers claim that no policy response is needed as they deny the scientific evidence for HICC. These two opposing views also represent vastly different worldviews regarding the role of government and business in society. Where interventionists want direct government regulatory control, denialists want small government, the unhindered functioning of free markets and freedom for the businesses that operate in those markets. In between these two positions lie a variety of policy options with their own associated worldviews.

Figure 1 shows the spectrum of policy responses defined by the opposing positions of acceptance of HICC and radical government intervention as the most appropriate government response and radical denial of HICC and the ideological defence of free markets against regulation and government interference. Between these positions there are battle lines that shift as a function of changing public and private attitudes, the ongoing reality of climate change impacts and debate over the role of government and business.

Although their influence has worked in very different ways, both the radical interventionist view and the radical denialist view inhibit the development and implementation of well-considered, timely climate policies. In particular, denialist activities have been successful in weakening the social and political will to address global warming in a concerted and pro-active manner. But as the science accumulates, dramatic weather events occur and observable environmental impacts become more evident, the power of the denialist position to influence business and political leaders and public opinion will diminish.

Even if the radical denialist position continues to influence public opinion, it will gradually hold less sway over policy makers and corporate leaders. It will not be so much the mounting scientific evidence that will convince many to take HICC seriously as it will the economic impacts of global warming through such realities as rising insurance premiums, emergency service costs, special assistance payments for drought and flood affected regions and the relocation costs of coastal housing and infrastructure. The emergence of politically sensitive topics such as responding to the issue of climate refugees will also impact greatly on public opinion. The increasing acceptance of HICC will not, however, automatically mean that governments and business will take the proactive steps necessarily to address climate change impacts. Greater recognition of the scientific reality of global warming will not necessarily shift worldviews that are suspicious of government regulation or unilateral action by a few progressive businesses. Opposition to government action may even be galvanised by increasing acknowledgement of HICC.

As the realities of HICC impacts hit home, the real battle ground will become less over whether HICC is a fact or not, and more over what the policy response should be. The battle will move from one defined by scientific versus anti-intellectual worldviews to one of interventionist worldviews versus free market worldviews. As the urgency of the climate crisis escalates, the debate over government regulation versus market-based solutions will take centre stage. Of course, this is already happening to some degree with the contrasting policy positions of the Commonwealth Government (moderate interventionist position via the carbon tax and other legislated measures) and the Opposition (free market position via its Direct Action Plan). However, the debate over whether interventionist or free market policies offer the best pathway to responding to HICC will continue to grow. Doubt about the efficacy of government intervention to address HICC may even become as much a barrier to action as the denialist strategy of manufacturing doubt about the scientific basis of HICC. To unpack this topic further I need to describe a few more features of the policy response spectrum.

The next two posts will unpack those features.

Reference

Rogers, M, Curtis, A & Mazur, N 2012, 'The influence of cognitive processes on rural landholder responses to climate change', Journal of Environmental Management, vol. 111, pp. 258-266.